1-Nov-2011 • Chris C.
The 2006 midterm election outcome that unseated the Republican Party, which was the majority party in both the House and the Senate prior to the election, was widely interpreted as a move by American voters to change the direction of the war in Iraq. At the time, a deeply rooted insurgency and increasing sectarian violence in Iraq was taking a massive toll in terms of U.S. service member casualties and regional stability. The Bush Administration pursued a “surge” policy that added 21,500 troops to the war in Iraq in a concentrated effort to quell violence and restore order in the rapidly deteriorating state.
Following the disbanding of the Ba’ath Party and the capture of Saddam Hussein in late 2003, Iraq’s government transitioned from a Sunni (minority sect) led government to a Shia (majority sect) led government. A nationalistic and eventually anti-Shia Sunni insurgency took hold. Shia militias fought back and by 2006 sectarian violence was so rampant that many analysts feared that Iraq was on the verge of civil war and more broadly, at risk of further destabilizing the region. The violence had left nearly 3,000 U.S. servicemen and women dead by the time the 2006 midterm election came around. American voters gave Democrats, whom largely ran on a troop withdrawal platform, control of Congress; thus initiating a more substantive debate over how to proceed in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan commission (also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission), had several findings and made numerous recommendations. Poor planning and execution of the war during early stages were discovered to be the primary causes of the eroding state of Iraq. Given the fact that Republicans were predominate in Washington throughout the evolution of the problem, the Bush Administration was ultimately forced to take responsibility for the problem, but it did not dwell on that fact. Rather, the Bush Administration sought to maintain control of the agenda and re-frame the problem by focusing the debate on the future. Specifically, the Bush Administration stated that a failure in Iraq was unacceptable because it would pose a grave threat to homeland security and America’s interests abroad.
Rejecting nearly all of the recommendations made by the Baker-Hamilton Commission, taking into account the National Intelligence Estimate, and borrowing heavily from a white paper written by the American Enterprise Institute, the Bush Administration crafted a policy called “The New Way Forward” which sought to increase troop levels within Iraq and was centered around a counterinsurgency strategy that would attempt to seize, secure, and hold areas that were ripe with insurgent and sectarian violence while winning the hearts and minds of the populous. In theory, this would deny the enemy sanctuary and build public support, which is seen as essential in counterinsurgency, while reducing violence and instability in the long-run. Though no specific timeline was given, officials did not expect quick results and some feared meager results at best. Moreover, it was anticipated that violence would continue for some time and that meant more U.S. service-member casualties, more Iraqi civilian casualties, and additional collateral damage within Iraqi communities. Important stakeholders included: U.S. service-members, the American public, defense contractors, Iraqis, countries within the region, NATO allies, Democrats and Republicans, as well as the Bush Administration. In support of the troop surge policy were defense contractors, the Iraqi government, regional allies, most Republicans, and the Bush Administration.
Knowing that the surge policy would be highly controversial, the Bush Administration worked proactively to head off opposition. It was so effective that despite intense debate and significant external pressures, particularly from Congress, opponents of “The New Way Forward” largely remained reactive throughout the course of the debate. The Bush Administration found alternative options, which included troop withdrawals and negotiating with Syria and Iran, unpalatable because it would be a concession of failure in its opinion. As such, the decision to adopt the surge policy was a command style decision because for the Bush Administration, there were no acceptable alternatives.
Tasked with carrying out the policy was the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Fresh troops began arriving in Iraq on February 8, 2007 and overseeing the buildup was General David Petraeus, commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). The surge policy was defined clearly in terms of the number of troops to be committed to Iraq, but other factors such as logistics, that is, how the military was going to meet the troop commitment, was left to the military to sort out. This was done in order to afford military commanders sufficient flexibility in carrying out the policy in a timely manner without adversely impacting other theaters (e.g., Afghanistan). Given that strategy was developed at the command level of the military and the subsequent orders were passed down the ranks, the surge policy is characterized as top-down in nature.
Though there was no specific group or agency responsible for evaluating the troop surge policy, numerous stakeholders and actors provided assessment of the progress or lack thereof throughout the course of the policy. Congressional and partisan opponents of the policy paid particularly close attention to the conditions in Iraq, but the media, various human rights organizations, the American public (via polls), the Department of Defense, and the Bush Administration also offered evaluations. Commonly being evaluated was the level of violence in Iraq and the progress of the Iraqi government in meeting U.S. Congressional benchmarks established in 2006. Though both the level of violence in Iraq and the improvements made within the Iraqi government were used to evaluate the policy, the surge itself was directed only at improving the former, not the later. Ultimately, extreme violence and instability in Iraq subsided and most have credited, at least in part, the surge policy for the improvements. With the favorable outcome, the policy was terminated and in 2009, the Obama Administration began withdrawing troops in an effort to meet its stated goal of being out of Iraq by 2011.
Assessing the Iraq surge policy gives a great deal of insight into the complexities of the policy process. The policy model, despite all caveats, does tend to force individuals into visualizing the policy process in a linear fashion. In reality, the various stages can overlap and take place in different orders. For example, with the surge policy, there was a degree of overlap with policy formulation and policy adoption given the lack of agreeable alternatives in the eyes of the Bush Administration. That said, it is valuable to discuss the policy process in stages, regardless of order, because it facilitates the identification of key aspects of the process that otherwise could be lost if one looks at policy simply from a macro standpoint. Learning about the policy process opens one’s eyes to the number of factors that go into making a policy as well as illustrating the reasons that less than optimal policies are sometimes adopted. The surge policy process shows the power of controlling the agenda and framing the problem. Despite significant opposition, these factors allowed for policy adoption.
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Department of Defense. Jun. 2008. Web. 27 Sept. 2011. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Master_16_June_08_%20FINAL_SIGNED%20.pdf.
“President’s Address to the Nation.” Office of the Press Secretary. 10 Jan. 2007. Web. 15 Sept. 2011. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html.
“The World Fact Book: Iraq.” Central Intelligence Agency. 27 Sept. 2011. Web. 27 Sept. 2011. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html.
“Timeline: The Iraq War.” Council on Foreign Relations. 28 Sept. 2011. Web. 30 Sept. 2011. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/timeline-iraq-war/p18876.
Balz, Dan and Cohen, Jon. “Independent Voters Favor Democrats by 2 to 1 in Poll.” The Washington Post. 24 Oct. 2006. Web. 27 Sept. 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/23/AR2006102300766.html.
Katel, Peter. “New Strategy in Iraq.” CQ Researcher 17.8 (2007): 169-192. Web. 10 Sept. 2011.
Petraeus, David H. “Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq.” Department of Defense. 10 Sept. 2007. Web. 27 Sept. 2011. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf.