Obtaining Nuclear Weapons: So Easy a Caveman Can Do It

1-Nov-2011 • Chris C.

[The below memo was from an exercise in 2011 to assess the ease by which states can proliferate.]

SUMMARY

There are many reasons that states pursue nuclear weapons, numerous options available to them in the pursuit thereof, and regrettably, insufficient means to prevent a state with sufficient resources from acquiring nuclear weapons once it is determined to do so. Taking a holistic approach towards understanding why and how states proliferate is critical, as is understanding the current limitations of established institutions that are in place to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Without a broader understanding, nuclear weapons proliferation will remain feasible for the creative and resolute.

CAUSES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURSUIT BY STATES

Despite the wealth of past monocausal theories as to why states pursue nuclear weapons, top proliferation scholars and analysts in recent years have begun to take a more holistic approach that takes into account the staggering complexity of state level decision making. This multicausal approach embraces the fact that the international system is dynamic, all states are unique, and most importantly, multicausality relies on fewer underlying assumptions and generalizations. With that, the most compelling explanations of nuclear weapons pursuit are: security, domestic politics, and ideas, norms and status.

Security

Inequality in security relationships and perceived threats are among the most accepted rationale for why states pursue nuclear weapons. Though a logical explanation, it should be cautioned that historically, security relationships have been over relied upon as a sole explanation for nuclear weapons pursuit. As noted by Potter and Mukhatzhanova, the often feared “nuclear cascade” or “tipping point,” where one states obtaining nuclear weapons status triggers the widespread pursuit of nuclear weapons by rival states, has yet to materialize as many had predicted.¹ Indeed there are examples of states that choose not to increase their rate of pursuit (e.g., India)² or even to abstain from pursuing nuclear weapons (e.g., Taiwan)³ despite facing deteriorating security relationships and increased threat perception. Moreover, Sagan points out that security motivations are a convenient explanation for states seeking to justify how their pursuit of nuclear weapons serves state interests.⁴

That being said, there appears to be solid historical merit to the security model. Often mentioned are apparent examples of states pursuing nuclear weapons, at least in part, due to the fact that a rival state obtained nuclear weapons. Common examples include the former Soviet Union pursuing nuclear weapons following U.S. obtainment, and the Pakistani pursuit following Indian obtainment. Additionally, Bleek’s quantitative analysis of state proliferation via hazard modeling provides interesting insight into state behavior based on security relationships. His analysis found that states that have long standing tensions and fight frequently are more likely to proliferate.⁵ He also discovered that states with strong security guarantees, that is, states that are under the “nuclear umbrella” of a nuclear weapons state, are less likely to explore, pursue, or obtain nuclear weapons.⁶ But again, counter to common wisdom, Bleek’s work establishes that in and of itself, there is no significant correlation between rival proliferation and the pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state.⁷

Domestic Politics

A state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons, as with all decision making within governments, is influenced by numerous factors including state actors, the economy, and industrial capacity to name a few. Actors that influence domestic politics range from governmental organizations (e.g., the military and civil energy organization), political leaders, to the populous at large. Sagan presents India as a prime example of domestic politics leading to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Specifically, Sagan highlights India’s initial reluctance to pursue nuclear weapons, but with pressure from its Atomic Energy Commission in alliance with defense laboratories, combined with low approval ratings, then Prime Minister Gandhi approved the “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion.”⁸

Further, Hymans and Solingen have brought forth predominant models that seek to explain nuclear weapons pursuit by states. One involves leader personality traits through “national identity conception” and the other involves “political coalitions” and regime survival.

Hymans argues that leaders that possess “oppositional nationalist” national identity conceptions are quite likely to pursue nuclear weapons, given sufficient power, because of their characteristic animosity towards an external rival(s) coupled with intense emotion, specifically, pride and fear. This leads to hyper sensitivity, threat inflation, and confidence in the state’s ability to achieve impressive ends (i.e., to challenge their rival(s)).⁹ Hymans illustrates his theory by using Australia as a case study. John Gordon, whom was the Australian prime minister from 1968-1971, met the oppositional nationalist national identity conception and pushed Australia towards nuclear weapons until Gough Whitlam replaced him as prime minister.¹⁰

Taking a more broad approach, Solingen believes that nuclear weapons pursuit is driven by political coalitions and regime survival. She separates political coalitions by those that are economically inward-looking and those that are economically outward-looking.¹¹ That is to say, coalitions that prefer import substitution versus international economic integration. Lastly, Solingen asserts that the more economically integrated a state is, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons.¹² However, Bleek’s work contradicts that assessment, noting that there is a positive, albeit small, correlation between economic integration and nuclear acquisition.¹³

Ideas, Norms and Status

Ideas, norms, and status assesses nuclear weapons ambitions in a symbolic light. In other words, the way nuclear weapons are perceived in terms of power, prestige, and status are potential driving factors behind state proliferation. Sagan notes the importance of roles, routines, and rituals.¹⁴ Many states may in fact believe that in order to take on the role, or be perceived as, a superpower, they might need to possess nuclear weapons to symbolize their power, legitimacy, and modernity. Sagan uses France as an example using a letter from de Gaulle to Eisenhower stating that “the atomic bomb was a dramatic symbol of French independence and was thus needed for France to continue to be seen, by itself and others, as a great power.”¹⁵

METHODS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURSUIT BY STATES

There are two methods by which states pursuing nuclear weapons can choose: acquisition and indigenous development. Acquisition refers to the purchase and transfer of an actual nuclear device and indigenous development refers to the ground up development of a domestic nuclear weapons program with or without the aid of another state or states.

Acquisition

Acquisition of a nuclear weapon or weapons would be the fastest way for a state to become a nuclear weapons state. That being said, there are numerous hurdles that would have to be overcome in order for this scenario to take place. First, requisite of the transaction, is a seller. Given the political sensitivity, existing norms, and international treaties involving nuclear weapons and their holders (e.g., NPT), it would be a tough proposition for both parties. It is reasonable to assume that the international blowback of such an open transaction would be severe. As such, any deal would likely need to be covert or conducted via proxy. To date, no such transaction between states has openly taken place, but it remains a possibility however small. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that should Saudi Arabia decide to pursue nuclear weapons, it may proposition Pakistan for such a transaction. Given that Saudi Arabia bankrolled much of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program early on, it is not inconceivable that Pakistan might feel some sense of obligation to follow through. It is also speculated that some sort of reciprocal arrangement may have taken place as a contingency of Saudi financing. Potential Saudi proliferation aside, acquisition remains a short-term solution that does not confer much flexibility over the long-term. Indeed, without the ability to make or reliably obtain more weapons, acquisition may actually weaken a state’s security position.

Indigenous Development

Given the constraints of acquisition, indigenous development with or without the aid of other states remains the most realistic means of pursuing nuclear weapons for most states. That said, indigenous development is no simple task and requires significant financial, industrial, and human resources. A pursuant state will first need to determine what type of nuclear device it should make. Gun-type devices are less complex to manufacture and are highly reliable, but require more U-235, are larger (i.e., tactical options are limited), and have lower yields. Implosion-type devices are vastly more complex and require among other things, advanced machining of the core and explosive lenses, as well as sophisticated synchronized fuzing. However, either U-235 or Pu-239 can be used in implosion-type devices which are smaller, require less fissile material, and have larger yields than gun-type devices.

Selection of a device is dependent upon a number of factors such as: whether the state already has a civil nuclear program, has a mining capacity (i.e., can it mine uranium), can it enrich uranium or reprocess for plutonium, does it need to purchase enriched uranium or plutonium, is its industrial infrastructure modernized, how much human capital is available (i.e., does the state have a sufficient number of nuclear scientists and engineers required to build and sustain an advanced nuclear program), and whether or not it will it be receiving technical aid from another state. Dependent factors such as the aforementioned have led states to pursue different types of weapons. For example, Iraq’s nuclear weapons program attempted to design a simple gun-type bomb while North Korea was initially constrained to designing and testing an implosion-type device that used plutonium reprocessed from the spent fuel of its Magnox reactor in Yongbyon.¹⁶ Dependent factors aside, building up towards a weapons program under the guise of civil nuclear program (HW-BWR are particularly useful for Pu-239, H-3, H-2, and Li-6 production—all isotopes used in Pu bombs)¹⁷, gaining expertise in nuclear processes, all the while developing latent capabilities aimed towards achieving a break-out capability would seem to be the least restrictive and most shielded path towards developing indigenous nuclear weapons.

EFFECTIVENESS OF INSTITUTIONS IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURSUIT BY STATES

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in conjunction with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have been forced to adapt due to the perversion and non-adherence of the written language of the NPT throughout their history. Initially, non-nuclear weapons states were misusing their nuclear fuel cycles to proliferate, then came proliferation through undeclared nuclear material and activities within non-nuclear weapons states, and today the primary concern is that states can use the guarantee of peaceful technology under the NPT to build latent capabilities while maintaining the ability to break-out (i.e., develop nuclear weapons in short-order).¹⁸ In fact, as many as 50 current signatories to the NPT are assessed to have sufficient latent capabilities to breakout.¹⁹ On a positive note, Bleek’s hazard modeling indicates that non-nuclear weapons states that have ratified the NPT are significantly less likely to pursue nuclear weapons than are non-signatories.²⁰ With 189 signatories this is no small statistic. This is perhaps due to the fact that states have already chosen to forgo the option of nuclear weapons pursuit by the time they sign the treaty. Thus using their signature as a signal to the international community. That being said, North Korea was developing its nuclear weapons program while it was in the NPT and Iran is widely suspected to be clandestinely working on a weapons program despite being a signatory of the NPT. Improvements to safeguards and verification like those adopted in the Model Protocol Additional were a step in the right direction, but today are falling short. Goldschmidt correctly argues that timeliness and breadth of inspections need to improve. As does access to information, persons, locations, and original documents. Moreover, the institutions have done little to decrease the stock-price of nuclear weapons to slow progress towards disarmament.²¹ Non-nuclear weapons states are right to complain about non-mandatory safeguards on nuclear weapons states.

NOTES