Still the Most Dangerous Place on Earth

1-Nov-2011 • Chris C.

[The below memo was from an exercise in 2011 to assess the most likely scenario whereby WMD would be used in South Asia.]

SUMMARY

Indo-Pakistani conflict and nuclear weapons possession by both states represents the greatest threat of WMD usage in South Asia. With Pakistan increasingly relying on Islamist groups to help achieve its foreign policy objectives, an attack or series of attacks on India by a Pakistani-based and supported mujahideen insurgent and militant organization or organizations is the most likely scenario wherein Indo-Pakistani tensions spiral into nuclear conflict. The U.S. needs to leverage its position of influence as a chief aid provider to Pakistan in order to bring about a swift and permanent end to the relationships Pakistan has with various mujahideen insurgent and militant organizations. Lastly, serious bilateral talks between India and Pakistan need to resume, and minimum deterrence, improved nuclear stewardship, clear nuclear doctrine, and improved signaling need to be at the center of U.S. policy towards India and Pakistan in order to prevent escalating the Indo-Pakistani conflict.

THREAT OF WMD USAGE IN SOUTH ASIA

Nuclear weapons are the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) most likely to be used in South Asia. Within the region, India and Pakistan are the only two states known to currently possess WMD.¹ Both India and Pakistan maintain declared and demonstrated nuclear weapon capabilities.² Neither state has a declared biological or chemical weapons program.³ Though both India and Pakistan have latent biological and chemical weapons capabilities, both states are signatories to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention. Moreover, there is no indication that either state has a clandestine biological or chemical weapons program.⁴ Given the history of veiled nuclear threats between India and Pakistan and the absence of Indian and Pakistani biological and chemical weapons programs, nuclear weapons usage remains the only substantial WMD threat in South Asia.

INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT

An attack or series of attacks on India by a Pakistani-based and supported mujahideen insurgent and militant organization or organizations is the most likely scenario wherein Indo-Pakistani tensions spiral into nuclear conflict. Despite official Pakistani denouncement and banning of several Islamist organizations in Pakistan, leading experts continue to assert that elements within the Pakistani government, specifically the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), are still providing material support for insurgents and militants in order to fight a proxy war intended to bleed and break the will of India.⁵

Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri insurgents and militants is rooted in its desire to unite Jammu and Kashmir, currently administered by India, with Pakistan and remains a chief source of conflict between the states.⁶ Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), two prominent mujahideen insurgent and militant organizations supported by Pakistan, with proximate goals of liberating Jammu and Kashmir, continue to threaten regional peace and stability.⁷

JeM and LeT were involved in the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, and more recently, LeT was behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks.⁸ The 2001 Indian Parliament attack resulted in a massive Indian and Pakistani military mobilization and a nine month standoff full of rhetoric that sufficiently raised the international community’s fear of a subcontinental nuclear war.⁹ The Mumbai attacks also led to increased tensions following back-and-forth threats and troop movements.¹⁰

Potentially, conventional fighting could break out and escalate as a result of the periodic exchanges of artillery along the Line of Control (LoC), or in the event of a military incursion by Pakistani or Indian security forces, as was exemplified by the Kargil War in 1999, but these are not the most likely scenarios that would lead to nuclear conflict.¹¹

India’s commitment to the status quo makes it unlikely that it would act unless severely provoked by Pakistan. And today, Pakistan is heavily reliant on American foreign aid and is not likely to jeopardize that with significant overt aggression towards India. Most importantly, statements offered by Pakistani officials and the trend over the past decade suggests that Pakistan is increasingly relying on the violence of insurgents and militants in order to further its foreign policy objectives towards India.¹²

This fact coupled with India’s growing impatience over Pakistan’s support of organizations like LeT and JeM would certainly increase tensions, and could spark hostilities, in the event another act of terrorism takes place in India that can be traced back to Pakistan.¹³

POLICY OPTIONS AND THREAT REDUCTION

The United States needs to take a new approach to Pakistani engagement. It is essential that Pakistan cease its support of Islamist organizations immediately. This is a continuing problem that threatens regional peace and stability and it is the single current action that is most likely to spur interstate conflict. The United States should leverage its position of influence as a chief aid provider to Pakistan in order to bring about a swift and permanent end to the relationships Pakistan has with various mujahideen insurgent and militant organizations.¹⁴

In order to ensure that Pakistan willingly ceases its support of Islamist organizations and begins to pursue them in good faith, there also needs to be a deal sweetener for them. Threats to pull aid alone will not change Pakistani policy considering U.S. dependence on Pakistan for its war in Afghanistan and more generally, its efforts to root out terrorists and terrorist organizations. As such, the U.S. needs to be prepared to make concessions and deals outside of just providing more aid.¹⁵

The United States also needs to rally the international community to pressure both India and Pakistan to revisit serious bilateral talks on territorial disputes. With the Kashmir dispute being the single most caustic issue between India and Pakistan, failure to come to the table for real discussions on how to resolve the problem all but guarantees prolonged conflict, and of course the more serious threat of nuclear conflict.¹⁶

Nuclear stewardship is also vital to improving relations between India and Pakistan. Pakistan in particular needs to be urged to do a better job of securing its weapons, and eliminating the potential for unintended usage. Modern permissive action links, potentially provided by the U.S., demated warheads, and centralized authorization protocols would reduce international criticisms of Pakistan and curb Indian fears.¹⁷

Minimum deterrence should also be on the agenda for India and Pakistan. Limiting the number of nuclear weapons will prevent costly arms races and show that both states are serious about decreasing tensions in the region. India will certainly have to consider China with regards to its deterrence strategy, but a willingness to cap its strategic nuclear arsenal will be a good first step towards reducing Pakistani paranoia.¹⁸

Pakistan needs to develop a clear nuclear doctrine. Maintaining an ambiguous doctrine only increases the likelihood of miscommunication/misinterpretation and deterioration of its security relationship with India. Moreover, both India and Pakistan need to reconsider the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Adoption of such treaties would send a signal to not only the other respective country but also the international community.¹⁹

End Notes

The analysis provided within this memo was based on the Central and South Asian geographic constructs of the U.S. Department of State. States included in this region are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

“Pakistan: Troops end attack on Karachi naval air base.” BBC. 23 May 2011. Web. 18 Nov. 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13495127. Goldberg, Jefferey, “The Ally From Hell.” The Atlantic. Dec. 2011. Web. 18 Nov. 2011. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/8730/.