Al-Shabaab: On the Ropes, but Still Fighting

14-May-2012 • Chris C.

Al-Shabaab poses a credible threat to American interests overseas as well as posing a real threat to the U.S. homeland. Since 2003, the U.S. has waged a counterterrorism (CT) campaign with increasing intensity against al-Qa’ida in Somalia (AQIS).¹ U.S. CT efforts have successfully disrupted and to an extent, degraded AQIS and al-Shabaab, al-Qa’ida’s newly dubbed Somali franchise.² However, these efforts have failed to exploit existing organizational cleavages and dwindling popular support which threaten to dismantle and defeat al-Shabaab while dealing a significant blow to al-Qa’ida’s weakened core.³

U.S. CT policy towards al-Shabaab has improved since its commencement. CT efforts in Somalia began with special reconnaissance missions and have subsequently evolved into more concerted efforts which include: interagency intelligence gathering, special operations missions, and airstrikes.⁴ The U.S. has also supported Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in their efforts to dislodge al-Shabaab.⁵

Despite the glaring gap in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) upon beginning CT operations in Somalia, the work of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Horn of Africa/CIA elements has provided exceptional battlespace clarity to date.⁶ Bribery and coercion have resulted in the compliance of warlords and the kill/capture of numerous al-Shabaab operatives.⁷ The maintaining of a near-invisible U.S. footprint in Somalia since the beginning of U.S. CT operations in Somalia has inhibited al-Shabaab recruitment and propaganda that relies on U.S. imperialism for its message. Together, improved ISR and the small U.S. footprint has translated into efficient leader targeting and the disruption and degradation of al-Shabaab.

However, there is still a need for a more holistic, yet specific CT strategy in Somalia. U.S. CT policy needs to disaggregate al-Shabaab from its more broad CT policy towards al-Qa’ida because it fails to address the complex sociopolitical, ethnic, religious, and clan dimensions present in Somalia.⁸ Most Somalis are religiously moderate and place a much greater emphasis on clan and nation.⁹ This is inherently at odds with al-Qa’ida’s transnational focus and religious extremism, and has strained al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab is broken up into individual geographical commands and this has resulted in considerable tension amongst individual leaders, especially as foreign al-Qa’ida Central (AQC) members have gradually taken leadership roles from Somalis.¹⁰ As within al-Shabaab’s leadership, there exists ideological and “near versus far goal” friction amongst al-Shabaab’s Somali nationalist membership and the growing number of foreign terrorists.¹¹ Currently the organizational tensions are at a tipping point, and herein lies an opportunity to isolate and dismantle individual commands while denying al-Qa’ida Somalia as a sanctuary.¹²

The TFG and AMISOM forces have the potential to provide a local solution for these local problems. This increases the perceived legitimacy of operations and allows the U.S. to take a support role.¹³ That said, these forces are currently ineffective due to poor training and lack of resources. U.S. CT policy needs to remedy this while ensuring that the mission focus is universally understood in order to avoid exacerbating the conflict.¹⁴

U.S. CT policy needs to counter al-Shabaab propaganda, financing, and recruitment. Al-Shabaab has been increasing its online activity since 2008, and has successfully attracted foreign recruits, donations, and drawn itself closer to AQC.¹⁵ Countering al-Shabaab’s propaganda should focus on its failures as well as highlighting the scriptural perversions it uses to justify its tactics, techniques, and procedures.¹⁶ Moreover, counter-propaganda should make note of al-Shabaab’s use of hunger to maintain power in light of the current famine in Somalia.¹⁷ Countering recruitment and financing should begin with the targeting of Somali diaspora communities that al-Shabaab pulls from. Somali diaspora communities inside the U.S. currently pose a serious threat to the homeland due to their lack of communal homogeneity and their vulnerability to coercion from afar.¹⁸ Opportunities exist to penetrate al-Shabaab, gain intelligence, and through community outreach, CT professionals can cut off the avenues of al-Shabaab’s foreign support.

There needs to be a continuation of the existing emphasis on intelligence preparation of the battlefield.¹⁹ However, this needs to be in support of a CT approach that exercises smart power.²⁰ A comfort of force over diplomacy will not allow for long-term success in Somalia. Too much emphasis has been placed on leader targeting and use-of-force, which at best, have limited and diminishing returns, and could prove to be counterproductive at worst.

Capacity building and the erection of effective and non-corrupt governance is paramount. Basic services need to be provided by the TFG which in turn would deny al-Shabaab its current means of earning the support of the people.²¹ The establishment of an educational system is critical. Without it, Somalis will be unable to meet the demands of the ever globalizing world and organizations like al-Shabaab will be able to flourish. The injection of micro-lending has been successful in other developing countries and could forge the foundation of a legitimate economy in the currently failed state.²²

Furthering U.S. strategic communication while taking a multidimensional and tailored approach to CT in Somalia will provide an expedient route to defeating al-Shabaab. In doing so, al-Qa’ida’s core will be damaged and stability can establish itself in eastern Africa. Therefore reducing the threat to American interests overseas and to the homeland.

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