11-Dec-2012 • Chris C.
With the recent passing of the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that devastated the U.S. and jettisoned America into a global war on terrorism, much has been done to combat terrorist organizations and secure the homeland. However, there remains a broader threat to our national security than presented by terrorist organizations alone to which little attention has been given and woefully few resources have been directed: the nexus between international trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations.
Incidents in Mexico like the deadly blaze that killed 52 people at the Casino Royale, reportedly started by the Zeta Cartel, the recent daytime dumping of dozens of tortured bodies in Veracruz, and other occurrences of Mexican drug cartel violence that has left over 35,000 people dead in Mexico since late 2006; have caught the attention of the American public and policy makers in Washington. Yet, there is little indication that our government recognizes that the stakes extend beyond just preventing spillover violence in America and stemming the northbound flow of illegal immigrants and drugs. Seldom discussed is the existence of, and potential for, nexuses between Mexican trafficking organizations and foreign terrorist organizations. In concert, these organizations pose a more integrated and robust threat to the United States than they do as lone enterprises.
Pinpointing nexuses is a daunting task due to the decentralized and transnational nature of trafficking and terrorist organizations in a networked world of rapid communication and transit; but for the very reasons nexuses are difficult to identify for law enforcement and intelligence agencies, there is an increased likelihood of their genesis. Both trafficking and terrorist organizations have had to adapt to post-9/11 pressures, and as such, they are now relying on more complex and unconventional means of operation. One such example is their greater dependence upon sophisticated technology like encrypted communications equipment and software to elude authorities. Mexican drug cartels are increasingly using military-grade encrypted high frequency radio equipment and al-Qa’ida is encrypting files when it communicates internally far more often than in years past. Indeed, this illustrates the increasing need for both types of organizations to exploit available expertise and realize the comparative advantages of doing business with other organizations.
Though trafficking and terrorist organizations do not necessarily solicit cooperative arrangements from the beginning, and probably lean towards activity appropriation in nascent stages, they likely cross paths when using common expertise in such ventures as document forging and money laundering. That said, the far more significant factor in birthing what has been coined “marriages of convenience” is an enabling environment.
Both traffickers and terrorists thrive in areas with conflict, widespread corruption, and places with weak, competing, or non-governace. Coming to mind for most people are probably states like Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. However, Mexico too has these characteristics and increasingly more so. Mexico is currently ripe with conflict as Mexican President, Felipe Calderón, continues his war on Mexican drug cartels and the drug cartels increasingly fight amongst each other in a bloody battle for turf and market share. Mexico also suffers from widespread corruption that is suffocating nearly every level of its government. The resulting instability and insecurity caused by violence, rampant corruption, and a weakening government has markedly reduced the Mexican government’s ability to curb the growing reach of Mexican drug cartels which are estimated to take in between $13.6 to 48.4 billion annually from trafficking drugs to the United States. Despite U.S. aid and assistance through the Merida Initiative, about $1.5 billion since 2008, the current environmental conditions within Mexico remain fertile for trafficking and incubating terrorist organizations.
This dynamic that we are seeing in Mexico today has precedent. U.S. officials confirmed in 2009 that Hezbollah, a Lebanese terrorist organization, had smuggled contraband and persons across the Mexican border into the U.S. using the same trafficking routes as the Mexican drug cartels and may still be doing so. The extent of the relationship between Hezbollah and the Mexican traffickers remains unknown, but it is demonstrative of a nexus and potential thereof. More worrisome is the nexus between al-Qa’ida and Mexican drug cartels. Regardless of the depth of such a relationship, it would at the very least afford al-Qa’ida opportunities to slip into the United States undetected, much the same way as Hezbollah may still be doing.
Though nexus formation is a serious concern, it does present law enforcement and intelligence agencies with opportunities. When working with trafficking organizations, terrorists are forced to expose themselves more so than they normally would. Because the motives of a criminal are self-centric in nature as opposed to a terrorist’s dedication to political and ideological drivers, criminals are comparatively easy to flip. As such, collaboration by criminal and terrorist organizations provides an opportunity for penetration into the terrorist organization when weak targets within the criminal organization can be identified.
Of course, the greatest opportunity for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to combat these relationships lies within our own country. Reducing the demand for drugs within the United States would have a direct and profound impact on both the drug cartels and any terrorist organizations with which they may have relationships. Reducing the demand means reducing the revenue and power for both the drug traffickers and their terrorist brethren. The math is compelling: the source of income is cut, the criminal organization shrinks, and the advantages for nexuses decreases.
Unfortunately, progress in reducing demand for drugs within the United States has been painstakingly slow. In the meantime, cooperative efforts between the U.S. and Mexico need to continue. Efforts like boomerang operations which launch Mexican authorities from the U.S. to avoid surveillance and tip-offs in Mexico have been reasonably successful so far. Also, encouraging is the acceptance of advisory roles of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Central Intelligence Agency, and retired military personnel within Mexico. Improving intelligence sharing will also go a long way towards building trust between countries, as well as increase the likelihood of interdicting drugs and high value individuals. All of this needs to be a part of a more holistic approach that identifies nexuses and the vulnerabilities that are created by such relationships. Moreover, reducing demand for drugs in the U.S. and improving intergovernmental cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico will go a long way towards weakening the Mexican drug cartels. But until the environment changes in Mexico, the conditions will remain fertile for nexus creation and undermine U.S. national security.