Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Africa: Short Essays

10-May-2013 • Chris C.

ESSAY 1 PROMPT

Compare and contrast the major Islamist terrorist groups in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Which are al-Qa’ida franchises and which are not? What are the major similarities and differences among all these groups and which do you think is most closely connected with al-Qa’ida Central? What evidence is there that these Islamist terrorist groups cooperate? What evidence is there, if any, that any of these groups cooperate with illicit traffickers? Which of these groups is the most dangerous to the United States?

ESSAY 1

There are seven major Islamist terrorist groups in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Amongst the groups, one distinction that can be drawn is that not all of the Islamist terrorist groups are al-Qa’ida (AQ) franchises. Ansar al-Sharia, Boko Haram, Ansar al-Dine, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJAO) are not al-Qa’ida franchises, while al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabaab or al-Qa’ida in Somalia (AQIS), and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are AQ franchises.

The leadership and structure of the Islamist terrorist groups covered in class are similar across the groups. Despite the presence in different forms in Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Mali, and Libya, the leadership of each Ansar al-Sharia group is unique, as is the leadership of Boko Haram, Ansar al-Dine, MOJAO, and the AQ franchises.¹ Additionally, all of the Islamist terrorist groups have hierarchical structures.

With regards to ideology, all of the major Islamist terrorist groups in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are Salafist Jihadist organizations which seek, among other things, to implement Shari’a Law, remove Western influence, and establish an Islamic caliphate.² However, in terms of strategy and focus, the groups vary. Unlike the MOJAO and the AQ franchises, Ansar al-Sharia, Boko Haram, and Ansar al-Dine generally do not operate transnationally and are predominantly focused on the “near enemy.” The exception being Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen, where the distinction between Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP is not clear.³

When considering the area of operation for the Islamist terrorist groups, there is a degree of overlap between some of the groups. Ansar al-Dine, Ansar al-Sharia, MOJAO, and AQIM are all parties to the Malian conflict.⁴ MOJAO is also present in Algeria and aspiring to move further westward.⁵ Additionally, Ansar al-Sharia and AQIM are in Libya.⁶ Notwithstanding its Malian and Libyan presence, AQIM also operates across the Sahel and in the Maghreb. Boko Haram operates predominantly in northern Nigeria, though it has carried out high profile attacks in southern Nigeria in the past.⁷ AQIS is based out of Somalia, but has extended its area of operation into Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda at times.⁸ Since Saudi Arabia cracked down on AQAP in 2008, AQAP has mostly operated in Yemen, where an Ansar al-Sharia group has also set up shop.⁹

Another area of differentiation for the Islamist terrorist groups is cooperation with illicit traffickers. In particular, AQIM and AQIS work closely with traffickers. AQIM is leveraging centuries old trade and smuggling routes in northern Africa to help finance their operations.¹⁰ Specifically, they provide paid protection for drug and contraband smugglers which use the routes to move drugs to Europe and move contraband across the Sahel and Maghreb.¹¹ AQIS is known for its poaching activities. Selling ivory and horn to finance its operations, AQIS has worked with traffickers which sell their goods, largely, to a lucrative Chinese market.¹²

Aside from the existence of cooperative arrangements between traffickers, the Islamist terrorist organizations also affiliate with each other. Intergroup association is evidenced by familial and tribal ties, as well as group descendants. In Mali, Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar al-Dine, AQIM, and MOJAO have openly worked alongside one another and together in varying capacities.¹³ Outside of Mali, AQIM is closely tied to the splinter group MOJAO, in addition to having ties with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Boko Haram in Nigeria.¹⁴ For Boko Haram, its cooperation with AQIM and AQIS, which Boko also has ties to, is evidenced by its transition to using AQ targeting and attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).¹⁵ AQIS has also benefitted in terms of knowledge and personnel sharing from its cooperation with AQAP.¹⁶ An important distinction to make when discussing affiliation is that while all of the AQ franchises are affiliated, Ansar al-Sharia groups, despite having a common name, are not interconnected like the AQ franchises. AQ franchises also have differing levels of association with AQ Central (AQC).

Aside from the fact that many analysts have already asserted that AQAP is the most closely tied franchise to AQC, there are indications that this is indeed the case.¹⁷ First, AQAP’s leadership, comparatively, held the closest ties to bin Ladin and AQC’s senior leadership prior to bin Ladin’s death.¹⁸ Since bin Ladin’s death, there hasn’t been any indication that the leadership’s proximity with AQC waned. Furthermore, despite the historical relationship between AQIM’s leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, there are no signs that AQIM has become more connected to AQC since bin Ladin was killed. Additionally, AQAP has been the most active AQ franchise in terms of trying to strike the U.S. homeland.¹⁹ More than just having the ability to carry out the attacks, the ambitions and rhetoric emanating from AQAP are increasingly similar to AQC, suggesting that AQAP has or is attempting to take on the operational role of AQC.

AQAP is also the most dangerous group to the United States. Not just because of its close ties to AQC, but because it has carried out more high profile attacks on the U.S. than the other groups. Notably, the attack on the U.S.S Cole, which occurred before AQAP took its current shape, the 2009 underwear bomber, and 2010 cargo plane bomb incident were all taken credit for by AQAP.²⁰ Recently, AQAP’s Inspire Magazine provided the Boston Bomber’s with their bomb blueprints.²¹ Thus, AQAP has done what other groups have not and remains a threat.

ESSAY 2 PROMPT

Compare and contrast any Islamist terrorist group in Africa with a non-Islamist African terrorist group, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army. What are the similarities and differences? What counterterrorist policy options would you suggest the United States take to disrupt and defeat these groups? Would the policy options be the same or different for the different type terrorist groups?

ESSAY 2

When comparing al-Shabaab (AQIS) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), several similarities and differences emerge. First, both AQIS and the LRA are designated as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” by the U.S. Department of State and their leaders are included in the “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” list.²² The two terrorist organizations are also religious fundamentalist groups. They also seek to establish religion based governance in their areas of influence. For AQIS, this means establishing Shari’a law and for the LRA, it means establishing governance based on the Ten Commandments. Additionally, both groups impose extremely harsh punishments including the cutting off of limbs, tongues, and in some instances death for those that do not adhere to their extreme set of values, norms, and beliefs. Their memberships are similarly comprised of young soldiers. Al-Shabaab, meaning The Youth, is predominantly led by young soldiers, while the LRA has the majority of its ranks filled with child soldiers.²³ Another area of similarity is that both groups having operated in Uganda, there is a small overlap in their area of operations. AQIS and the LRA also share opponents.²⁴ The U.S. and African Union forces are actively pursuing both groups and their leadership. Furthermore, AQIS and the LRA are both involved in poaching activities.²⁵ They are profiting from the sale of ivory and horn to criminal syndicates which sell them in lucrative overseas markets.

Despite the similarities between AQIS and the LRA, there are numerous differences between the two terrorist organizations. Though both groups hold religious ideologies and motivations, they are radically different. One is a militant Islamist group and the LRA is a militant Christian fundamentalist group.²⁶ Specifically, AQIS is a Salafist Jihadist organization which seeks to implement Shari’a Law, remove Western influence, and establish an Islamic caliphate.²⁷ While the specifics of the LRA’s ideology are not always clear, what is clear is that the organization seeks to implement rule under a strict interpretation of the Bible’s Ten Commandments.²⁸ In terms of membership, the two groups fill their ranks quite differently. AQIS is able to recruit from within Somalia as well as pulling in foreign recruits, many of them from the West.²⁹ In contrast, the LRA is almost entirely comprised of soldiers that are being forced to fight for the group, many of whom were abducted by the LRA over the years.³⁰ They are also different in size. AQIS is suspected of having as many as 6,000 members.³¹ In contrast, the LRA might have as few as several hundred fighters.³² When discussing leadership, the LRA has a charismatic leader and clear leadership structure, AQIS does not have a charismatic leader and its chain of command is more obscure.³³ Moreover, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for the LRA’s Joseph Kony, and to-date, the ICC has not issued similar warrants for AQIS leaders.³⁴ While both groups have extended their area of operation into Uganda at times, AQIS operates predominantly in Somalia while the LRA is currently suspected of being in the Central African Republic.³⁵ An important distinction is that while the LRA is on the run and does not hold any areas of control. AQIS however, does hold and control parts of Somalia. That said, the LRA has received state sponsorship in the past and AQIS has not.³⁶ One other difference between the two terrorist organizations is the targeting and tactics used in attacks. AQIS attacks government, Sufi, or symbolic targets, whereas the LRA mostly conducts raids on villages.³⁷

When looking at the goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating AQIS and the LRA, the U.S. should tailor holistic policies for each group individually. Dubbed the “whole-of-government” approach, diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL) assets can be used in concert to achieve these goals. Put simply, there are strategies of development, defense, diplomacy.

In Somalia, governance, institutions, capacity, human capital, and security are almost non-existent.³⁸ Given this reality, military, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts need to be front loaded in order to weaken AQIS to the point where development and institution building can occur. At which point there could be a transition to law enforcement from military centric approaches to counterrorism. Despite having unparalleled military and intelligence capabilities, the U.S. needs to continue letting the African Union and regional forces take the lead in peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations within Somalia while providing support. Through advising, training, and equipping African forces, a more legitimate solution towards disrupting and ultimately defeating AQIS is established. That said, the occasional use of U.S. drone strikes and SOF on the ground are a necessary evil until indigenous forces can take over the role.

Dealing with less of an isolated insurgency and more of a roving terrorist organization, the policies towards the LRA need to be different. In that Kony and the LRA are on the run and not posing a static and persistent threat to any one locale, development and diplomacy can occur simultaneously with the efforts of defense forces. Not ignoring the fact that the U.S. should be advising, training, and equipping African forces, while providing critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to commanders, the real opportunity to take down the LRA is through the erection of institutions, growing legal frameworks, building more effective governance, and dealing with structural shortcomings across Uganda, Sudan, the D.R.C., and the Central African Republic. Emphasis should be on multilateral approaches where the African Union would preside over the multinational efforts.

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