The Franchise on the Rise: The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria

6-May-2013 • Chris C.

Introduction

Over the years, the threat from al-Qa’ida has evolved dramatically. On May 2, 2011, U.S. forces killed Usama bin Ladin during a raid on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. In the wake of the raid, al-Qa’ida was left decentralized and shifted international attention from al-Qa’ida Central (AQC) to its franchises. Consequently, U.S. counterterrorism efforts also evolved and began to emphasize the individual threats emanating from the various al-Qa’ida franchises. At the time, experts worried that the loss of bin Ladin would spur the movement of al-Qa’ida’s central leadership from the then less certain sanctuary of Pakistan to the lawless parts of Yemen and Africa. Of particular concern was the potential merger of AQC’s leadership with the operationally active al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in order to supplant the degraded AQC. Given the political instability of Yemen, the freedom of movement enjoyed by AQAP militants, and AQAP’s proven dedication to strike the U.S., it was widely agreed upon that AQAP was the largest prevailing threat to the U.S. homeland.¹

In similar fashion, al-Shabaab, al-Qa’ida’s Somali franchise, has been a focal point of U.S. counterterrorism operations. However, due to the apparent progress of the U.S. “offshore balancing” strategy coupled with the persistent efforts of African Union forces, this pursuit has been less noteworthy in the past couple of years.² By January of 2013, the focus, both from the U.S. and its international allies, shifted towards al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which is involved in the Islamist insurgency in northern Mali and likely behind the recent coordinated terrorist attacks in Algeria. As a result of the French intervention and U.S. support in the Malian conflict combined with the aforementioned counterterrorism campaigns making up the bulk of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, there has been little discussion about al-Qa’ida’s presence outside of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

In analyzing the evolution of al-Qa’ida threats and U.S. policy reactions, the al-Qa’ida franchise in Iraq, now calling itself al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-‘Iraq wa’al-Sham or the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria, but also referred to as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), has largely been forgotten. Indeed AQI has more than doubled its presence in Iraq during the past year and has silently seeded the Syrian conflict with militants from its ranks.³ Capitalizing on Iraq’s Sunni minority feeling of political marginalization and the increase in sectarian violence, al-Qa’ida is strengthening its base across Mesopotamia. Having now claimed Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the strongest and most capable Islamist fighting force in the Syrian civil war, AQI’s vision of regional sanctuary and unified struggle is quickly transitioning from a pipe dream to a reality.⁴ Now more than ever, it is important to pay attention to the Iraq based al-Qa’ida franchise.

This paper first traces the origins of AQI and its descendant in Syria, JN. Next the current state of AQI is discussed in terms of the organization’s current involvement in the Syrian civil war and the growing sectarian conflict in Iraq. Finally, the paper concludes that when looking at the current conditions in Iraq, Syria, and across the region as a whole, not only is AQI on the rise, but it will continue to grow and threaten regional stability as it successfully co-opts regional struggles.

Al-Qa’ida in Iraq

Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), an al-Qa’ida franchise sometimes referred to as al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia or the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), was founded in 2004 and first led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi, whose birth name was Ahmed Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh, was born in Zarqa, Jordan, a small mining community, in 1966.⁵ Barely literate and a high school dropout, Zarqawi spent his youth committing petty crimes and even spent some time in prison for drug possession and sexual assault.⁶ It is suspected that it is this time in prison which exposed him to radical religious beliefs and ultimately led to his moving to Afghanistan in 1989 to join the mujahideen in the fight against the Soviets.⁷

In Afghanistan, Zarqawi spent the majority of his time in Peshawar where he honed his Salafist beliefs and learned from his mentor, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.⁸ Additionally, it is during this time that Zarqawi’s was first introduced to Usama bin Ladin and his nascent al-Qa’ida organization.⁹ Returning to Jordan in 1992 with Maqdisi, Zarqawi formed Bayat al-Imam which harshly criticized the monarchy and attempted to carry out a terrorist attack on a theater in 1993.¹⁰ Zarqawi was quickly arrested for crimes against the state and remained incarcerated until 1999.¹¹ Upon his release, he briefly spent time in Europe, but soon moved back to Afghanistan where he set up a training camp in Herat near the Iranian border.¹² During his time in Herat, Zarqawi renewed his ties with al-Qa’ida and bin Ladin.¹³

Surviving a U.S. missile attack on his training camp in late 2001, Zarqawi temporarily relocated his operation to Iran before being directed by al-Qa’ida to link up with Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish al-Qa’ida affiliate in northern Iraq.¹⁴ Under the banner of his newly formed Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ) organization, designated by the U.S. as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in October of 2004, Zarqawi had U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley assassinated in 2002 in Amman, Jordan, and at the behest of senior al-Qa’ida leadership in Iran, coordinated the flow of foreign fighters from Syria into Iraq just prior to and following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.¹⁵ Due to the robust and distributed nature of JTJ’s network in Iraq at the time, al-Qa’ida relied heavily on JTJ to facilitate its operational activities and in the carrying out of attacks against coalition forces and Iraqi targets.¹⁶ This cooperative arrangement ultimately led to the creation of AQI as an official al-Qa’ida franchise, and bin Ladin’s naming Zarqawi as its emir in late 2004.¹⁷

Following a four part strategy devised by Zarqawi, AQI began carrying out savage attacks on U.S. allies, Iraqi government personnel and infrastructure, government employees and civilians associated with reconstruction efforts, and against Shi’ites and Shi’a holy sites.¹⁸ By the middle of 2005, senior al-Qa’ida leadership, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, had tried to convince Zarqawi that his tactics were negatively impacting al-Qa’ida and its goals both locally and globally. In an effort to mitigate the negative impacts of al-Zarqawi’s campaign, AQI representatives and members of five other affiliated organizations rebranded AQI to form the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) in January 2006.¹⁹ Having been cut out by the MSC, Zarqawi had little influence until he was killed by a U.S. airstrike on June 7, 2006.²⁰

Despite AQI’s desire to improve its image by being reconstituted as the MSC, Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri, and AQI continued to stir sectarian tensions until Zarqawi’s death.²¹ However, by that point the damage had been done, and in the middle of 2006, there was a backlash known as the “Sunni Awakening” against AQI from within Iraq’s Sunni communities. As a result, AQI rebranded itself yet again, and by October 2006 had become the Islamic State of Iraq and named Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its new emir.²² It was at this point that the AQI began to transition away from centralized leadership and began to move towards institutionalized bureaucracy in order to prevent future issues like those that arose as a result of al-Zarqawi’s autonomy.²³

Both Abu Hamza and Abu Omar were killed in a counterterrorism raid in Tikrit on April 18, 2010.²⁴ Having its top two leaders eliminated, and its overall membership down, many considered AQI defeated.²⁵ Succeeding Abu Omar is the AQI’s current emir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.²⁶

Jabhat al-Nusra

While JN formally announced its formation to the world in January 2012, its leadership and infrastructure date back to early 2000.²⁷ It is first important to emphasize that JN and AQI are not in fact separate groups. Indeed, JN is simply an extension of AQI that was sent to Syria in late 2011 to wage Jihad and extend AQI’s reach into al-Sham, or greater Syria.²⁸ As such they have shared beginnings.

Noted in the previous section, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, AQI’s founding leader, was commanding a JTJ training camp in Herat, Afghanistan between 2000 and early 2001. Many of the 2,000 to 3,000 fighters that were at the camp came from of Jordan, Palestine, and Syria.²⁹ Of importance is that Zarqawi’s training camp was the only training camp in Afghanistan hosting Syrian fighters.³⁰ Among other things, this is the result of the informal network that Zarqawi began to build following his return from Afghanistan in 1992. Then operating under the name of Bayat al-Imam, his group quickly expanded its reach not only into Syria, but also across Europe, the Middle East, and into the Persian Gulf.³¹ Despite being imprisoned from 1993 until 1999, Zarqawi continued to spread his message and extend his network.³² Accordingly, Zarqawi’s connection with Syria and Syrian jihadists dates back to the early 1990’s.

Moving his camp from Afghanistan into Iran following U.S. airstrikes in 2001, Zarqawi briefly set up shop.³³ However, members of his JTJ group who were arrested in Europe at the beginning of 2002 tipped off Western intelligence agencies to his whereabouts, and he was forced out of Iran.³⁴ It was at this time that senior al-Qa’ida’s leadership asked him to linkup with Ansar al-Islam, an al-Qa’ida affiliate in northern Iraq.³⁵ Obliging, Zarqawi directed high ranking members from within his ranks to head to Syria and Lebanon to bolster existing networks while he would be exercising control over the organization from Iraq.³⁶

Continuously moving amongst his cadres in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon to avoid being picked up by Western intelligence agencies, Zarqawi was able to establish an extremely robust smuggling network prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of 2003.³⁷ A sophisticated network of financiers, intelligence collectors, safe houses, and arms smugglers was established in relatively short order. The financial network primarily operated out of Syria.³⁸ Money was sent to financiers within Zarqawi’s network in Syria, mostly from donors in the Gulf.³⁹ From there, the money funded operational expenses across the network. Additionally, Zarqawi’s network in Syria was also the chief point of entry for foreign fighters into Iraq.⁴⁰ The erection of safe houses in Syria, called guesthouses, streamlined the funneling of foreign fighters into Iraq following al-Qa’ida’s call to arms against the “invading” coalition forces in Iraq.⁴¹

With the call out to jihadists around the world to join the struggle against the “crusaders,” the Zarqawi network was put into overdrive.⁴² In the following years, parts of the network were taken down by coalition forces and some prominent leaders were killed, however, the network remained intact. Even in 2007 when Syria reversed its previous policy of providing tacit support for AQI, what had since become the AQI network survived by going underground and many of the targeted members fled to Iraq.⁴³ The efforts of the Syrian government, however, were not to last. Having been dealt a serious blow by U.S. and Iraqi counterterrorism efforts, some of AQI’s leadership were able to move into eastern Syria by the summer of 2009.⁴⁴ AQI continued to operate in Iraq and Syria in the lead up to the Syrian civil war, but did so mostly from the shadows.

By March 2011, what began as a popular uprising against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, had gained traction and violence had broken out. The AQI network, far from dismantled, began to reestablish itself. Indeed many of the former players that had been forced out of Syria into Iraq and surrounding countries between 2006 and 2007 returned to Syria.⁴⁵ Around the same time, a meeting called by Baghdadi, AQI’s current leader, and AQI’s senior leadership was held. The purpose of the meeting was to determine how to expand their sphere of influence into Syria given the apparent opportunity provided by the insurrection.⁴⁶ Ultimately, the leadership collectively agreed to send prominent Syrian jihadists and guerilla warfare experts from within its ranks to lead the newly formed JN.⁴⁷ A Syrian and former confidant to AQI’s founding leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani was selected to lead JN.

Julani was chosen because of his extensive experience fighting in Iraq, his ties to senior AQI leaders, and likely most importantly, his Syrian roots.⁴⁸ His name suggests he has ties to the Golan Heights, but little else is known about him. This is due in part to the short time he has been a prominent leader in the great AQI organization, but is largely due to the decentralized and compartmentalized nature of AQI’s leadership.

On January 23, 2012, JN announced its existence through a YouTube video that was distributed across the internet and found on prominent jihadists forums.⁴⁹ The reputation of JN as a well financed, disciplined, and capable force soon followed. Adding to JN’s prestige and legitimacy, JN received numerous endorsements from prominent Islamist ideologues including: Sheikh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi, and Sheikh Abu al-Zahra al-Zubaydi.⁵⁰ Shinqiti, a preeminent global jihadi ideologue of Mauritanian origin, went so far as to say that anyone interested in joining the jihad in Syria should not join any group other than JN and those that have pledged allegiance to JN.⁵¹ Shinqiti stated, “heed the command of God, who is exalted above all, to be one community, not separate communities; to fight under one banner, not different banners; to obey one commander, not multiple commanders; and to call themselves by one name [JN], not by separate names.”⁵²

By the spring of 2013, JN made up 7 to 9% of the rebel forces in Syria and was continuing to grow. In real numbers, estimates showed JN having as many as 10,000 soldiers fighting in Syria.⁵³ In fact, rebels were leaving other groups by the droves to join JN, largely due to its vast amount of resources and success on the battlefield.⁵⁴ On April 8, 2013, Baghdadi, released an audio message announcing the brand merger of AQI and JN to al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-‘Iraq wa’al-Sham or the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIGS). The message also described in some detail the relationship between AQI and JN. In the recording, Baghdadi begins by declaring that, “it’s now time to declare in front of the people of the Levant and world that the al Nusrah Front is but an extension of the Islamic State of Iraq and part of it,” and continues to note that al-Julani, JN’s leader, is a subordinate of his.⁵⁵ “We deputized al Julani, and he is one of our soldiers, and with him a group of our sons, and we pushed them from Iraq to the Levant so as to meet our cells in the Levant.”⁵⁶ Moreover, Baghdadi notes, “we [AQI’s senior leadership] laid for them plans, and drew up for them [JN’s leadership] the policy of work, and gave them what financial support we could every month, and supplied them with men who had known the battlefields of jihad, from the emigrants and the natives.”⁵⁷

Prior to the announcement, JN and AQI had been very careful not to mention each other and in some instances outright denied a relationship with each other.⁵⁸ There is some speculation that the announcement may have been at the behest of Zawahiri, but regardless, this led to some controversy with JN.⁵⁹ Two days after Baghdadi released his message, al-Julani released a message that, while offering plenty of praise for Baghdadi, declined to adhere to aspects of his declarations.

First, Julani notes that he was not consulted on the decisions put forth in Baghdadi’s message. “We inform you that the leadership of the Front and its Majlis Al-Shura and the humble slave the general commander of Jabhat al-Nusra have no knowledge of this declaration except what they heard from the media. So if the attributed speech was accurate we weren’t consulted or ordered to do so.”⁶⁰ He then affirms his allegiance to al-Qa’ida and Zawahiri in saying, “from the sons of Jabhat Al-Nusra and its general commander we renew it to the sheikh of jihad sheikh Aymen Al-Zawahiri may Allah preserve him.”⁶¹ Julani goes on to note that JN will be keeping its name, but assures that every other aspect of AQI and JN’s relationship will “remain as you knew it and the declaration of the Baya’a won’t change anything in its policy.”⁶²

While the apparent leadership squabble between Julani and Baghdadi is important, it has also distracted from the big picture. AQI and JN as a collective are growing at an alarming rate, and are becoming more and more capable of expanding their violent and extreme Salafist jihadist agenda across Mesopotamia and al-Sham. Regardless of whether or not JN continues to operate under the auspices of its own banner or not, JN, as explicitly noted by al-Julani in his April 10, 2013 audio message, still falls under AQI and is loyal to al-Qa’ida.⁶³ Though distinctions can certainly be drawn between JN and AQI, given their interconnected nature and increasing dependence upon each other; when looking at al-Qa’ida’s regional goals, it is most useful to look at them as a single entity, ISIGS.

Political Disenfranchisement and Sectarian Violence in Iraq: A Catalyst for AQ

The state of political affairs in Iraq is increasingly becoming an issue for regional and international concern. The power struggle in Baghdad may be pushing the Iraqi government towards a breaking point. Shi’a parties are rife with infighting, Kurdish power brokers are boycotting, and alarmingly there has been an exodus of Sunni politicians from the Shi’a dominated government led by the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki.⁶⁴ With four Sunnis resigning from cabinet posts since March 2013 and Sunni political parties threatening to boycott parliament altogether, there are strong indications that the minority sect is withdrawing from Iraq’s political process.⁶⁵

Votes from Iraq’s April election have not been completely tallied due to violence in the Sunni majority Anbar and Nenevah provinces, but based on where the votes have been counted, the provincial elections turned out 22% fewer voters than the election in 2009.⁶⁶ With Sunni protesters across Sunni dominated provinces in Iraq’s west and north calling for outright boycotts of the government in Baghdad, the common feeling amongst Sunnis that the Iraqi government’s power sharing arrangement has been a failure comes without surprise. A paper published by the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace notes:

Opponents charge that the prime minister backed away from the powersharing [sic] agreements he had forged with Iraqiyya and the Kurds. Indeed, Maliki employed an expansive interpretation of the powers granted to the prime minister by the constitution, in particular “the naming of the Cabinet’s members” (Article 76), taking charge of both the formation of the cabinet and the appointment of strategic ministries. In addition, the central government’s influence in the provinces—where all Iraq’s political groups have their electoral strongholds—allowed the prime minister to strengthen allies, weaken local rivals, and tip the scales of parliamentary power in his favor.⁶⁷

As prime minister and Shi’a political figure, Maliki has done very little to reassure Sunnis that they are being fairly represented and that their voices are being heard. Indeed Maliki has recently indicated that he desires an entirely Shi’ite led government.⁶⁸ With his rapid consolidation of power, exertion of control over Iraq’s military, and his quickness to put down any protest against the government, since his 2010 re-appointment, protests have become common place. An incident in Hawija on April 23, near Kirkuk, in the wake of the provincial elections, where Iraqi security forces stormed an encampment of protesters resulted in over 50 dead and 180 injured Iraqis.⁶⁹ This kicked off a deadly string of sectarian violence across Iraq. The continuing sectarian violence resulted in 712 deaths in April alone.⁷⁰ More than had been seen in a one month period over the past five years.⁷¹

Concerns over a new civil war in Iraq are quietly beginning to emerge.⁷² With violence ravaging the country and dangerous sectarian fueled rhetoric emanating from elected officials, a perfect storm is currently gestating in Iraq.⁷³ Formerly moderate Sunni leaders across Iraq are now abandoning peaceful protests, which have been going on since December, and calling their followers to arms.⁷⁴ Emboldened by the predominantly Sunni led rebellion in Syria against the Assad regime, Iraq’s disenfranchised minority is increasingly seeing an alternate way of trying to achieve their goals in Iraq.⁷⁵ Fearful of a Syrian like scenario in Iraq, the Shi’a led government has responded to violence with expansive sweeps and excessive force. Defending its actions by categorizing those caught in its crosshairs as al-Qa’ida or Ba’athists.⁷⁶ A sharp rise in attacks on Sunni religious sites across Iraq has only served to further stoke sectarian tensions.⁷⁷ Benefitting from the bloodshed and deepening divide in Iraq, the ISIGS is carrying out its own attacks and positioning itself to capitalize on the mounting Sunni grievances.

Anarchy, Sanctuary, and Arms: Underwriting AQ’s Future in Syria

In Syria, political disenfranchisement and demand for political reform led to protests across the country beginning in March 2011. In response, the Assad regime suppressed the protests violently, and staunchly rejected the calls for democratic reforms; reforms which would essentially lead to the unseating of Syria’s power elite. Since 1963 when Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s father, and the Syrian Ba’ath Party with the help of Shi’a elites took power in a coup, Syria has been under minority rule.⁷⁸ Democracy in Syria would not only dissolve the current government, but would likely result in reprisals against members of the former regime.⁷⁹ Seen as more than just a fight for regime survival, Assad tightened his regime’s grip and doubled down on his opposition. Dispensing riot agents and using live fire to disperse crowds ultimately led to an expansion of violence, and the once peaceful protests evolved into what is today, a full fledged civil war.

With the current fighting and anarchy, suffering is rampant in Syria. Since the outset of violence in Syria, more than 80,000 people have died and over 4.25 million Syrians have been internally displaced.⁸⁰ Some 8,000 Syrians have been fleeing Syria every day, adding to the 1.4 million Syrian refugees living outside of Syria.⁸¹ The lawless nature of the Syrian countryside has led to mass looting and profiteering. Increasingly, there are areas that have become criminal sanctuaries ripe with rebel units free to operate with impunity. Some units have even been overtaken by the allure of personal enrichment. For them, the spoils of war now outweigh the previous objective of fighting the Assad regime.⁸² Not only have historical anthropological sites been looted, but Syrian industry in areas outside of government control are being dismantled and sold piecemeal by rebel forces.⁸³ Other problems endemic in war torn areas such as rape, armed robbery, and murder have also been reported.

Established in August 2011 by Syrian Army defectors, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) is the main opposition force in Syria.⁸⁴ However, the FSA has been fragmented, unreliable, and comparatively ineffective.⁸⁵ Seeking to bolster the rebels, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have been arming the rebels while the U.S. has provided technical support and training to fighters.⁸⁶ Arms making their way to the rebels are almost exclusively small arms due to concerns over supplying heavy arms which could eventually end up in the hands of jihadists.⁸⁷ However, some analysts suggest that heavy arms are in fact finding their way into rebel hands due to sponsors from the Gulf.⁸⁸ Despite in place vetting processes, arms are unavoidably ending up in the hands of jihadists.⁸⁹ Of gravest concern are Chemical Weapons. The Assad regime has large stockpiles of chemical weapons around the country and their control is less than guaranteed. Following allegations of their use in April and May of 2013, it remains unclear whether the Assad regime or the rebels in fact used the weapons in the reported attacks.⁹⁰

The Resurgence of al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia and al-Sham

The ISIGS is now the largest and most operational al-Qa’ida franchise.⁹¹ It has been able to draw foreign recruits from across northern Africa, Europe, Iraq, Lebanon, and indeed from the furthest corners of the Muslim world to fight in the Syrian conflict.⁹² These jihadists heeding the call of Zawahiri and other Islamist ideologues are joining a growing number of local recruits eager to have a part in determining their future.⁹³

Similarly, the ISIGS is rapidly picking up recruits in Iraq, further bolstering its ranks.⁹⁴ Embittered by a sense of political marginalization and religious persecution, Iraq’s Sunni minority is taking up arms against its Shi’a led government.⁹⁵ Having over doubled its presence in Iraq over the past year, the ISIGS is expanding its Iraq front and attempting to merge it with the ongoing struggle in Syria.⁹⁶ Envisioning a borderless struggle against surrounding Shi’a and “apostate” regimes, the ISIGS is a serious threat to regional security. Israeli airstrikes on Syrian military targets, Hezbollah’s entrance into the war, and the bombings in Turkey further highlight the expanding nature of the conflict.⁹⁷

As instability spreads across the region, the ISIGS is finding more than just new recruits, it is establishing new sanctuary. Importantly, the ISIGS is holding territories that it is conquering. While it has returned, and in some instances brought previously unseen services to communities, it has also been installing Shari’a law and imposing its strict beliefs upon populations.⁹⁸ Through the building of new institutions and taking on a governing role, the ISIGS is effectively planting its roots as it expands. Thus allowing for the group to operate with impunity over growing swaths of territory. Dislodging the group in the future will be more and more difficult with every day that passes.

In addition to holding territory, the ISIGS is well armed and able to defend their holdings. Largely thanks to the proxy war being fought by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the U.S. in Syria, the ISIGS has no shortage of small arms and ammunition.⁹⁹ ISIGS units have also successfully captured Syrian armor and have received heavy arms from sponsors in the Gulf.¹⁰⁰ Extensive experience in bomb making and employment coupled with the level of institutional knowledge involving strategic, operational, and tactical best practices accumulating within the ISIGS, has really positioned the ISIGS well for longevity.¹⁰¹

Further complicating things, the existence of stockpiled chemical weapons in Syria could lead to a worst case scenario where the ISIGS took control of a cache. There is already ambiguity surrounding the likely use of chemical weapons in Syria.¹⁰² Should the ISIGS get its hands on chemical weapons, it would be entirely consistent with al-Qa’ida’s rhetoric that the group would use the weapons. Use of chemical weapons in Syria had previously been called a “red line” by the Obama administration, but in the wake of chemical weapons usage in Syria, no additional actions have been taken.¹⁰³ This highlights the U.S.’s extreme reluctance to become more involved in conflicts in the region.

Now ten years since the U.S. led invasion of Iraq, the level of U.S. aversion to becoming re-involved in the country militarily is only matched by Iraq’s unwillingness to host the U.S. Politically limited in how it pursues the ISIGS, the U.S. has only a few tools at its disposal. Finding a middle ground, the U.S. has sent CIA advisors to aid Iraqi counterterrorism units.¹⁰⁴ However, unless Iraqi forces loosen their grip on minority Sunni communities and immediate political concessions are made by the Maliki regime, little is likely to change. The ISIGS is currently thriving off of the renewed sectarian tensions in Iraq and increasingly in Syria.

The sectarian nature of the conflict in Syria and violence in Iraq illuminates longstanding sectarian fault lines in the region. The Assad regime fearing for its survival, has had to oppress its Sunni opponents since the Ba’athist party took control in 1963. During both the Muslim Brotherhood uprisings in the 1980’s and the now civil war, Sunni governments in the region have aligned against Syria. Currently waging a proxy war against the Syrian government to return the Sunni majority sect to power, a degree of legitimacy has been afforded to the ISIGS as a result.

The Assad regime, literally fighting for its life, has left an impression on the Shi’a governments of Iraq and Iran. Feeling surrounded and seeing foreign policies being drawn along sectarian lines, the governments have altered their own policies. In Iraq as mentioned, the government has continuously put down its now emboldened Sunni minority in an attempt to avoid a Syrian like fate. Resulting in a very favorable hand for the ISIGS amongst Iraq’s Sunni communities. Further removed, but feeling the impact, Iran is also positioning itself to hold on to its influence in Iraq and Syria. Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, according to one of its leaders, is entirely at the direction of Iran.¹⁰⁵

For the ISIGS, sectarian conflict, growing sanctuary, arms proliferation, and the West’s inability to effectively target it, has made the al-Qa’ida franchise a regional, and more and more, an international threat.

Conclusion

Having now co-opted what began as a popular struggle against the Assad regime, the ISIGS has expanded its focus beyond Syria. Learning from past mistakes in Iraq, the ISIGS has successfully garnered support through the downplaying of itself as an al-Qa’ida franchise and the playing up of its proximate goals of uprooting regional regimes. Due to widening sectarian violence, moderate Sunnis are increasingly accepting the ISIGS as a legitimate party to the growing conflicts. Complicating matters, the U.S. is politically constrained in what it can do to address the rising ISIGS. So while regional governments line up like dominoes, the ISIGS is not only trying to give them a nudge, but positioning itself to benefit when they fall.

While discussing the issue of chemical weapons falling into the hands of the ISIGS in surficial terms, this is definitely an area that deserves more attention. The current U.S. policies in the region is always a relevant topic of discussion. One such example not covered by this paper is the facilitating of arms transfers to Syrian rebels. It remains to be seen whether arming the rebel forces in Syria will have a net positive outcome. Regardless of whether the Assad regime falls, the second and third order effects associated with arms finding their way to jihadists has bad historical precedence. Moreover, this paper is by no means a comprehensive look at ISIGS. Rather, it serves as an entry point for renewing discussion about al-Qa’ida’s presence in Mesopotamia and al-Sham. Given the ISIGS’s rise, any works contributing to the events in Syria and Iraq are particularly timely.

Notes