Unmanned Deterrence: Deterring Terrorism With Armed Drones

22-May-2013 • Chris C.

INTRODUCTION

The September 11, 2001 attacks placed al-Qa’ida firmly in the crosshairs of U.S. counterterrorism officials. Despite the efforts of U.S. servicemembers and counterterrorism officials alike, al-Qa’ida remains a threat to the U.S. As noted in the most recent National Strategy For Counterterrorism, “The preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents.”¹ Having outlived the average life expectancy of a typical terrorist organization, and continuing to have its message resonate amongst some within the wider global Muslim community, the fight against al-Qa’ida threatens to persist into the foreseeable future.² Transitioning away from unsustainable protracted approaches of combating terrorists, the U.S. will become more and more dependent upon light footprint approaches to counterterrorism. Seemingly, the method of choice for killing terrorists has become the use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as armed drones. Indeed, President Barack Obama has over septupled the frequency of drone strikes from the George W. Bush administration since he took office.³ With this marked increase in drone strikes has come domestic controversy and international scrutiny.

The root causes of the controversy center around issues of legality and human rights. However, domestic concerns over the transparency of their useage and worries about drone proliferation and norm setting are also frequently discussed in drone debates. In terms of legality, the U.S. has not satisfactorily, in many people’s eyes, defended its use of lethal force against individual members or suspected associates of al-Qa’ida and groups affiliated with it. In regards to human rights, the argued low threshold for discrimination in drone strikes, has resulted in a significant number of civilians being killed. Increasingly, the lack of transparency surrounding the use of armed drones has many people concerned. Amongst some policymakers and scholars, the threat of setting poor international norms for the use of armed drones in the midst of rising drone proliferation, is quite disconcerting. Aside from unproductive “black and white” arguments surrounding armed drone policy, there has been little in the way of realistic policy recommendations.

More useful have been recommendations that acknowledge the utility of drones as a part of a larger counterterrorism strategy. Recommendations which seek to find a balance between existing policies and efforts to tailor methods of targeting and increase the transparency of armed drone use have been most appropriate. However, there has not been an open discussion about changing the framework around which the U.S. uses armed drones to-date. This paper argues that the U.S. should define and use armed drones, within the scope of counterterrorism, as a method of deterring individual terrorists, rather than simply as a method to disrupt terrorist organizations.

In utilizing deterrence vis-à-vis drone strikes, a distinct “red line” is established for anyone who decides to plan an attack or aid in an attempted attack on the U.S. “If you plan to attack the U.S., you will become the target of an armed drone strike.” This simple framework has the ability to significantly reduce domestic and international controversy by getting away from the policy of “mowing” the proverbial “lawn of terrorists.”⁴ It not only makes for a more compelling legal justification, but also through the imposition of stricter targeting guidelines, in theory, it should decrease the number of civilian casualties attributable to drone strikes. Moreover, it stays within the confines of broader U.S. counterterrorism policies, as well as, being cost effective and sustainable.

This paper first covers what drones are and discusses the history of the their use in the ongoing “drone campaign.” Next, the paper talks more in depth about how specifically armed drones have been used and why they are such a valuable counterterrorism tool. The paper then discusses the various strategies for deterring terrorism and introduces a new framework for deterring terrorism with armed drones.

THE DRONE CAMPAIGN

WHAT ARE DRONES?

So far, this paper has mentioned “drones,” but it has not defined what exactly a drone is. Unarmed drones are generally called unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) while armed drones are frequently called unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). The military, aside from calling its armed drones “unmanned combat aerial vehicles,” will sometimes refers to drones, generally, as “remotely piloted aerial systems.”⁵ Confusion has arisen as a result of interchanging terminology in reference to armed and unarmed drones, but as Matthews notes, “…“drone” has come to refer to unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), which are UAVs equipped with combat capabilities, most commonly the ability to launch missiles.”⁶ However, wishing to avoid confusion, armed drones will simply be referred to as “drones” in this paper despite the existence of more nuanced nomenclature.

The U.S. armed drone fleet is made up of General Atomics MQ-1B Predator and General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper drones. The General Atomics MQ-1B Predator, or Predator drone, is the most famous drone in the U.S. fleet.⁷ Before receiving a block designation (the ‘B’ in MQ-1B), the Predator first saw combat as an unarmed reconnaissance asset in Bosnia back in 1995.⁸ The Predator drone however, was retrofitted with Hellfire missiles by 2001 and deployed to Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.⁹ With regards to mission, the MQ-1B Predator is used for “medium-altitude, long endurance” mission sets, and is capable of providing “intelligence gathering” and “munitions capability.”¹⁰

The General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper, or Reaper drone, is as Matthews describes, “a larger UCAV capable of carrying a higher payload.”¹¹ Further distinguishing itself from the Predator, the mission of the Reaper is almost entirely hunting and killing, while it maintains a tertiary mission of intelligence collection “against high value, fleeting, and time sensitive targets.”¹² Joining the Predator drone in 2007, the Reaper is operated exclusively by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Joint Special Operations Command.¹³ Both the Predator and Reaper are currently being used in the drone campaign against al-Qa’ida and its affiliates.

HISTORY OF THE DRONE CAMPAIGN

The U.S. “drone campaign” which targets al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, began on February 4, 2002 when the CIA carried out its first drone strike.¹⁴ Targeting whom they believed to be al-Qa’ida fighters, and possibly Usama bin Ladin, the go-ahead was given for a strike on a known mujahideen base named Zhawar Kili in the Paktika province of Afghanistan.¹⁵ Having flown drones over Afghanistan since 2000, and armed drones in the aftermath of 9/11 in the support of military operations, the targeted killing of the three suspected al-Qa’ida members redefined the CIA’s boundaries.¹⁶ Prior to the drone strike, there had been heated discussions over the legality of the CIA using drones to directly target individuals. The discussions stemmed from a law passed in 1976 by President Ford’s signing of Executive Order 11905, which among other things, barred the CIA from carrying out assassinations.¹⁷ Weathering the minor criticism over the strike, the CIA soon expanded its new targeted killing campaign beyond Afghanistan.

On November 3, 2002, a hellfire missile struck a vehicle carrying six members of al-Qa’ida in Yemen.¹⁸ Among the dead was, Ali Qaed Sinan al-Harthi, believed to be a close associate of Usama bin Ladin, as well as the mastermind behind the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000.¹⁹ Despite having no precedent outside of Afghanistan, there was almost no mention of the incident in the media, and being in the recent wake of September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland, there was no domestic controversy. This is largely due to the fact that, at the time, there was little indication that there would be any sort of escalation or sustained campaign involving drones outside of the theaters of war.²⁰ Aside from a few hardcore proponents, most of the CIA’s senior leadership did not think there was much utility for armed drones. They were mostly viewed as “blunt” and “unsophisticated.”²¹ As such, the prevailing counterterrorism strategy involved the use of clandestine special operations forces and covert intelligence operatives.²² Indeed, the drone strike which killed Harthi was the last strike outside of a war zone for over a year.

After a lengthy negotiation between high ranking U.S. officials and the Pakistani government over U.S. use of Pakistani airspace, a deal was reached in June of 2004.²³ The deal opened up Pakistani airspace for the U.S. in return for the targeting and killing of Nek Muhammad, a Pakistani citizen who had ties to the Taliban and was an enemy of the Pakistani state.²⁴ On June 18, 2004, Muhammad was killed and the U.S. drone campaign henceforth began targeting al-Qa’ida and Taliban leaders in the remote tribal areas of Pakistan.²⁵ Over the next several years, the areas approved by the Pakistani government for the U.S. drone campaign, swaths of territory in Pakistian’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, became a variable shooting range for the CIA.²⁶

Feeling comfortable with its then nine year old drone campaign, and likely working with actionable intelligence obtained from the bin Laidin raid, the U.S. once again began using armed drones in Yemen.²⁷ The U.S. had been striking targets inside of Yemen with Tomahawk cruise missiles since the middle of 2009, but the drone strike on May 5, 2011 was the first of its kind since 2002.²⁸ Killed in the strike, Musaed Mubarak Aldaghery and Abdullah Mubarak Aldaghery, were brothers and operational leaders of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).²⁹ The growing belief that AQAP was a growing threat to the U.S. gave impetus for the continuation of the drone campaign in Yemen.³⁰

So what has been the impact of the eleven year drone campaign? The Long War Journal, which tracks the drone campaign, has compiled statistical data about drone strikes into a publically accessible database. According to their data, as of the writing of this paper, there have been 338 drone strikes killing 2,507 suspected militants and 153 civilians in Pakistan since 2004.³¹ In Yemen, there have been 68 drone strikes resulting in the death of 333 suspected militants and the death of 82 civilians since 2002.³² Drone strikes have also occurred in Somalia and Libya, as well as the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.³³ However, the Long War Journal does not track strikes in those countries, and reliable data is not available elsewhere. That said, this fact is inconsequential as the numbers from Pakistan and Yemen are only used in this paper to demonstrate that the drone campaign is very active, and has continued to increase in scope and intensity over the past years.³⁴ Today, the U.S. has busy drone bases being hosted by Pakistan, Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and the Seychelles, among other countries.³⁵ Across theses bases, the U.S. has expanded its drone fleet from 50 in 2001 to some 7,500 drones by April 2012.³⁶ Thus, given the heavy reliance on drones and drone strikes as a part of U.S. counterterrorism policy, it is worthwhile to look at how specifically the U.S. uses drones and answer why they are important.

HOW HAVE DRONES BEEN USED AND WHY ARE THEY IMPORTANT?

Throughout the drone campaign, the U.S. has used two methods of targeting. The first method is personality targeting. Drone strikes under this method, known as “personality strikes,” target a specific individual.³⁷ The second method is signature targeting. Under signature targeting, “signature strikes” are carried out against “individuals whose identities are unknown, but who exhibit certain patterns of behavior or defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity.”³⁸ Striking targets has been made more effective due to the unique attributes which drones bring to the table.

Within the boundaries of the drone campaign, drones successfully provide persistent surveillance and instantaneous responsiveness.³⁹ Persistent surveillance is achieved through the ‘round-the-clock coverage of a target or target area. In other words, overlapping drone coverage can provide real time surveillance 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year if required. This is possible because the Predator and Reaper drones “can remain aloft, fully loaded with munitions, for over fourteen hours.”⁴⁰ Prior to the widespread use of drones, manned aircraft surveillance was limited to a handful of hours at a time. For example, the F-16 fighter jet and A-10 ground attack aircraft can only linger over a target for about 4 hours.⁴¹

The instantaneous responsiveness, or more accurately put, the “on-demand” nature of drones, allows for split second decision making. Real time responsiveness gives drone pilots the flexibility to wait until the opportune moment to release missiles and munitions. It also allows the pilot to divert launched missiles at the last second in the event that the conditions on the ground become unfavorable for a strike.⁴² Though cruise missiles, and more so, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) can reach their targets quickly, they pale in comparison to the few second flight times of Hellfire missiles fired from drones.⁴³ Additionally, there is not a risk of misattribution associated with missiles fired from drones as there is with ICBMs, for example.⁴⁴

The unmanned nature of drones is also important. Aside from being able to linger longer than manned aircraft, the unmanned nature of drones also eliminates the risk of injury, capture, or death to pilots in hostile areas.⁴⁵ Moreover, drones are exceedingly inexpensive in terms of cost-to-own and cost-to-operate. For example, the flyaway cost of a new Reaper drone is $16.9 million for 2013, whereas the flyaway cost of a new F-35 is $153.1 million for 2013.⁴⁶ Combined with a drone’s ability to provide persistent surveillance and instantaneous responsiveness, the platform is unrivaled and ideal for permissive environments. As the then director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, put it, drones are the “only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership.”⁴⁷ Further emphasizing the importance of drones to U.S. counterterrorism policy, twenty-two of the thirty al-Qa’ida leaders actively targeted by the U.S. have been killed.⁴⁸ All with the exception of Usama bin Ladin were killed by drone strikes.⁴⁹ Even with the benefits of drone use seemingly weighing in the favor of the drone campaign, there has been no shortage of controversy.

WHY IS THE DRONE CAMPAIGN CONTROVERSIAL?

The drone campaign has been controversial for several reasons. These reasons include: the legality of drone strikes, potential human rights violations, lack of transparency surrounding the campaign, potentially negative norm setting affects in the midst of proliferation, and declining international opinion surrounding the use of drones. The legal justification that the Obama administration points to when defending its use of drone strikes, mostly signature strikes, depends on the domain. Domestically, the Obama administration points to the Use of Military Force joint resolution passed by Congress following the 9/11 attacks. It states that the President is:

“…authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”⁵⁰

When justifying the drone campaign internationally, several arguments emerge. According to Zenko, ”international legal justifications for U.S. drone strikes…stem from the assertion that the United States is in a continuous state of international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces.”⁵¹ Moreover, “As a result, the laws of armed conflict (or international humanitarian law) apply, including necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity.”⁵² With regards to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees, among other things, the right to life, the Obama administration states that the United Nations (UN) adopted treaty is only applicable to persons within the U.S.⁵³ Issues involving the violation of sovereignty are justified by Chapter VII, Article 51 in the Charter of the U.N. which reads:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”⁵⁴

According to the Obama administration, it is merely exercising its right to self-defense through the use of targeted killings when a “targeted country is unable or unwilling to counter imminent and significant threats.”⁵⁵

Even with its legal justifications in hand, potential issues with the Obama administration’s arguments still remain. Particularly in terms of signature strikes. As Heller, a legal scholar and associate professor at the Law School of Melbourne University, states, “Even if a U.S. signature strike can be considered a necessary proportionate response to an armed attack” it does not “mean that the use of deadly force against an individual was legal.”⁵⁶ He continues to explain that “extra-territorial targeted killing potentially violates two different…rights under international law.”⁵⁷ To include ”the right of the affected state to territorial sovereignty, as protected under Article 24 of the U.N. Charter” and ”the targeted individual’s right to life, as protected under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).”⁵⁸ Lastly, the issue of sovereignty aside, Heller argues that the burden is on the Obama administration to prove that it is not denying an individual’s right to life when carrying out targeted killings.⁵⁹

Related to the issue surrounding individual right to life, the number of civilian deaths associated with the drone campaign has led some to assert that the U.S. is violating human rights. Along with this, opinions of the U.S. drone campaign have dropped substantially. Not surprisingly, there are now widespread reports that civilian deaths “have angered local populations and created tensions in the United States’ relationship” with its host states.”⁶⁰

The exact numbers of civilian deaths and casualties remains difficult to pin-down. However, according to the estimates of the Long War Journal, there have been over two-hundred civilian deaths over the course of the drone campaign.⁶¹ While the number of signature strikes versus personality strikes is unknown, many associate the “lower bar” for signature strikes as the key contributor to civilian deaths. Opinion matters because “the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself,” indeed, “strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors.”⁶² Additionally, poor targeting strategies effect the required intelligence.

In the U.S., the issue of transparency has also become a hot button topic surrounding the drone campaign. Zenko accurately highlights that in “the United States, the public and policymakers are increasingly uneasy with limited transparency for targeted killings.”⁶³ Not knowing how individuals or groups of individuals are targeted, under signature strikes in particular, has been at the root. Moreover, the lack of openness involving decision making within the drone campaign has been disconcerting. Lastly, the Obama administration has not provided answers and remains largely dismissive of growing public concern.

Norm setting and the issue of growing drone proliferation are also points of debate with regards to the drone campaign. The U.S. will cease to hold a near-monopoly on drone use in the coming years.⁶⁴ As such, how the U.S. uses drones, or as some claim, misuses drones, in an offensive capacity, will set the stage for what is deemed acceptable for states like China. Indeed, “U.S. policy provides a powerful precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will increasingly deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramifications.”⁶⁵

STRATEGIES FOR DETERRING TERRORISM

WHAT IS DETERRENCE?

According to Kroenig, deterrence “is a strategic interaction in which an actor prevents an adversary from taking an action that the adversary otherwise would have taken by convincing the adversary that the cost of taking that action will outweigh any potential gains.”⁶⁶ Put differently, deterrence exacts costs for certain actions or reduces the expected benefit of an action.⁶⁷ Crenshaw adds that “effective deterrence has three minimum requirements. The defender needs to know the challenger’s values, how to credibly threaten those values, and how the threat will be received and acted on.”⁶⁸ Deterrence strategies can either be direct or indirect.

INDIRECT DETERRENCE

Indirect deterrence is “intended to pressure third parties who facilitate terrorism rather than terrorist operatives themselves.”⁶⁹ The idea is that terrorists rely on third parties in order to operate, and through the threat of punishment, third parties, now at risk, will cease to cooperate with a terrorist organization. Thus, preventing the terrorist organization “from obtaining the resources they need” in order to operate.⁷⁰ Third parties could include financiers, direct state sponsors, host states, criminal entities, or affiliated groups that work with the targeted organization.

A second form of indirect deterrence is “triadic deterrence” which involves “state/host-state/insurgent triads.”⁷¹ Triadic deterrence occurs when “one state uses punishments and/or threats against another state to deter it from supporting a non-state actor, if not to compel it to stop assisting it.”⁷² However it is important to note that the triadic deterrence relationship can only work when the host state has the ability to act as a “central authority.”⁷³ Atzili and Pearlman state that in “weak and divided governmental structures, competing domestic interests trump raison d’etat. Attempted deterrence thus does not have the intended results, regardless of the military power it projects.”⁷⁴

DIRECT DETERRENCE

There are two forms of direct deterrence. The first is deterrence by denial “which contribute[s] to deterrence by threatening to deny an adversary the benefits of a particular course of action.”⁷⁵ While strategies which exact costs “threaten retaliation,benefit denial strategies threaten failure.”⁷⁶ Therefore, if an adversary is led to believe that there is a low probability of success for a particular action, they might be able to be deterred from taking it.⁷⁷ It is also important to note that strategies of denial are inherently more credible than retaliatory threats due to the fact that they involve action and not the threat thereof.⁷⁸

Deterrence by denial exists at three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical involves efforts which seek “to improve homeland defenses and increase operational risk” as well as increasing the probability that an attack will be unsuccessful for potential terrorists.⁷⁹ Knopf points out that terrorists “may be willing to risk or give their lives, but not in futile attacks.”⁸⁰ At the operational level, the goal is to deny terrorists the capability of carrying out an attack by “restricting access to resources terrorist require to conduct an ongoing campaign of attacks.”⁸¹ Lastly, strategic deterrence by denial denies would-be terrorists their end goals.⁸² Methods of societal bolstering and resiliency tactics fall under this level. Knopf highlights that when “a society can demonstrate the ability to withstand terrorism, it sends a message that using this tactic will not enable terrorist organizations to achieve their goals.”⁸³

The second form of direct deterrence is deterrence by punishment. Most applicable to the drone campaign, deterrence by punishment, as Kroenig and Pavel put it, “seek[s] to achieve deterrence by threatening to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary if the adversary takes a particular course of action.”⁸⁴ Moreover, deterrence by punishment, also known as deterrence by retaliation, “involves a threat from the defender to do something new, not to continue a course of action.”⁸⁵

MIXED METHODS OF DETERRENCE

Mixed methods of deterrence include deterrence by delegitimization and cumulative deterrence. Deterrence by delegitimization combines deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment by “deny[ing] a terrorist organization the benefit of gaining approval and support while also imposing the punitive cost of increased criticism and loss of support.”⁸⁶ Also involving both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, cumulative deterrence is “based on a gradual wearing down of the adversary through offensive and defensive measures as well as positive inducements.”⁸⁷

POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS OF DETERRING TERRORISM

Given the nature of deterring terrorism and the difficulty associated with defining success in relationships involving deterrence, scholars in the fourth wave of deterrence research have been quite skeptical. Stein, perhaps more optimistic than some, states that deterring terrorism “is exceedingly difficult in practice, but not impossible in theory.”⁸⁸ A common critique is that it is not possible to deter someone who is willing to die.⁸⁹ This of course assumes that there are not other things, life aside, that a suicide terrorist values. Also common is the argument that a terrorists do not have return addresses. Atzili and Perman note that “non-state actors are well-positioned to withstand conventional retaliation due to their small size, secretive structures, and the lack of “return address” against which the actors that deter can retaliate.”⁹⁰ Perhaps the best critique involves the complexity of deterring terrorism. Wenger’s observation that “designing, communicating, and understanding” threats for terrorists is inherently more difficult than when similarly applied to state-to-state relationships, is accurate.⁹¹ Particularly when speaking about al-Qa’ida, the organization’s leadership “diffusion passively degrades a state’s ability to properly communicate threats and apply coercion, thereby invalidating deterrent/compellent strategies.”⁹² The incompatibility of deterrence and the aims of eradicating al-Qa’ida are also called into question in terms of deterrence. As Knopf astutely points out, “The U.S. intention to go after al Qaeda whether or not al Qaeda launches further attacks means there can be no U.S. promise to let the organization survive if it refrains from future terrorism.”⁹³

DETERRENCE IS STILL USEFUL WHEN APPLIED TO TERRORISM

Deterrence is still useful when applied to terrorism, but only when the goals of the method of deterrence wishing to be achieved are realistic. Deterring all terrorists is not possible, however, deterring some very well might be.⁹⁴ The focus should be on achieving results at the margins.⁹⁵ Asking for too much from deterrence is a recipe for disaster. As Wenger illustrates, “deterrence cannot be the focal point for counterterrorism. Deterrence is only one element of a broader influence strategy and therefore cannot serve as the overarching strategy for managing the relationship between states and terrorists.”⁹⁶

DETERRENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

The Bush administration feeling that the U.S. had become soft, particularly in its response to terrorism, saw deterrence as something that should be included in U.S. policy, but not something that should be relied upon.⁹⁷ The Bush administration saw deterrence as having a poor track record and often opted for preemptive measures to mitigate threats to the U.S.⁹⁸ That said, the official policy put forth, dubbed “tailored deterrence,” sought “to enable the United States to craft different deterrent options to address different adversaries and situations.”⁹⁹ Following 9/11, the administration, despite not relying on deterrence, took a strong deterrent approach.¹⁰⁰ In terms of deterring al-Qa’ida’s supporters, the Bush administration made it quite clear that anyone harbouring terrorists would be held accountable. This indirect approach served the purpose of punishing those associated with al-Qa’ida while denying al-Qa’ida the resources it needed to operate. When dealing with al-Qa’ida directly, the Bush administration took a deterrence by denial approach. The administration, “mostly focused on measures that would improve tactical deterrence - aiming to convince terrorists that particular attacks will not succeed.”¹⁰¹

The Obama administration, similar to the Bush administration, has not relied on deterrence. As was evidenced in the background of the drone campaign, the Obama administration has heavily relied on disrupting al-Qa’ida opposed to deterring it. Indeed, the words deter, deterrent, and deterring only appear three times in the National Strategy For Counterterrorism.¹⁰² The U.S.’s more holistic security strategy, outlined in the White House’s National Security Strategy document, only uses the words seventeen times and in vague overarching statements mostly referring to state-to-state relationships involving weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰³ It seems as if the fact that deterrence is not easily “compatible with killing, capturing, and defeating,” as Crenshaw points out, has left deterrence by the wayside.¹⁰⁴ The Obama administration’s current “3-D” approach to counterterrorism, disrupting, dismantling, and defeating (al-Qa’ida), does not include deterrence.¹⁰⁵

DETERRING TERRORISM USING ARMED DRONES

A NEW FRAMEWORK

When looking at the various ways that the drone campaign could achieve a deterrent effect, direct methods, specifically deterrence by punishment, is the only plausible solution. Indirect methods are not particularly useful in terms of the drone campaign. Given the fact that this form of deterrence deals with those on the periphery of violence, not those whom are directly responsible for acts of violence, drone strikes would not be a proportional response for third-parties. Striking third-parties would almost certainly exacerbate the already controversial nature of the drone campaign. As discussed when defining triadic deterrence, deterring states into taking action against terrorist organizations can only have positive results when the state has “central authority” and does not have competing political stakeholders.¹⁰⁶ Given that al-Qa’ida has set up shop in weak states like Pakistan and Yemen, triadic deterrence would only serve to further weaken the already fragile governments. Deterrence by denial is not applicable to the drone campaign either. Its mere essence involves the threat of failure whereas deterrence by denial, for example, threatens retaliation.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, the drone campaign, which currently is used to disrupt terrorist organizations, should be converted into a deterrence by punishment strategy against individual terrorists.

In transitioning to this new framework, the U.S. first needs to discontinue its use of signature strikes. By not targeting individuals for clear violations of a preestablished red line, not only is the signaling process damaged, but the requisite assurances for deterrence to work are not present.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, signature strikes, as can be viewed as an extension of preemption doctrine, would only serve to “undercut American deterrent efforts.”¹⁰⁹ As such, the red line should be established before those who have previously committed and/or aided in the commission of an act of terrorism on the U.S.; or are actively plotting, aiding in the commission of, or are in the process of carrying out an act of terrorism on the U.S. Any individual short of that threshold should not be targeted. For clarity and justifiability, the red line would have to be more detailed and define things like what is considered terrorism, what constitutes plotting, and what activities are considered to be aiding in the commission of terrorism, but those answers are beyond the scope of this paper.

ELIMINATING CONTROVERSY

As was highlighted earlier in the paper, there is a great deal of controversy surrounding the drone campaign. The controversy surrounding the legality of drone strikes stems almost entirely from the use of signature strikes. By eliminating signature strikes alone, the new framework sits on a much better legal foundation, even if the Obama administration ignores other areas of reform for the drone program. Legal justifications are further improved through the inclusion of the proposed red line. The relationship between “deterrence and right to self-defense” has long been a legitimate norm within the international community. As a result, questions over an individual’s “right to life” or “state sovereignty” would virtually disappear if the drone campaign operates under the proposed red line.

Presumably, the restricting of the drone campaign to personality strikes and the further restricting threshold for drone strikes would reduce civilian casualties. While allegations of human rights violations are always going to be present when a state uses violence, the justifiability of strikes under the proposed framework should greatly reduce such allegations. Moreover, international opinion over the use of drones, while currently damaged, could eventually improve with fewer civilian deaths and casualties.¹¹⁰

Related to opinions about the drone campaign, concerns over transparency could be greatly reduced with the new framework. Particularly if the Obama administration openly embraces this new framework. Ideally, the Obama administration would publish its list of people being targeted by the drone campaign, but that may not always be possible due to national security interests. Alternatively, in the future, as long as the U.S. names the intended targets of strikes and briefly notes how the individuals meet the threshold for a strike, fears over the misuse of drones can be alleviated. Lastly, the bolstered legal foundation and transparency offered under this framework would go a long way towards establishing a responsible use precedent for the international community. Norms are becoming increasingly important with drone proliferation. Thus, with the erection of new norms by the U.S., the concern over other states treading down a less desirable path can be diminished.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NEW FRAMEWORK

Aside from offering a way to reduce or eliminate controversy surrounding the drone campaign, the new framework is also consistent with the existing counterterrorism policy trajectory. Given the tightening of criteria for drone strikes, it may be offered that the new framework is taking a softer approach to al-Qa’ida. This however, is not the case. Those who have been involved in previous attacks on the U.S. are not given amnesty, rather, they are grandfathered into the list of targetable individuals because they have previously crossed the threshold. Moreover, concerns over a deviation from the current policy of disrupting al-Qa’ida through leadership decapitation are unwarranted. One would be hard pressed to find a senior al-Qa’ida leader that has not previously been involved in an act of terrorism against the U.S. Therefore, barring some extreme example where an individual al-Qa’ida leader slips through a hypothetical crack in the proposed framework, that aspect of the drone campaign remains business as usual.

Critics might also point to the problems associated with deterring terrorists, such as the fact that you cannot deter those that are willing to die. However, not all terrorists are undeterrable. Indeed, deterrence which relies on retaliatory threats could be quite “effective against those actors in a terrorist network who value their lives and property, such as leaders, financiers, and clerics.”¹¹¹ For those that are not deterrable, and do cross the line, targeting those individuals with drone strikes is probably the best option for the U.S.

With regards to the contradiction of seeking al-Qa’ida’s defeat and targeted drone strikes, the new framework also addresses this. While the disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately, the defeat of al-Qa’ida remain the core objectives, death is only prescribed to those that have sought to attack, attacked, or are in the process of attacking the U.S. Given the need for assurance in deterrence, no member of al-Qa’ida will be targeted for death that does not meet the threshold. Foot soldiers that are low in the food chain are largely left alone, assuming no history of terrorism or ongoing plots against the U.S., under the new framework. That has the added benefit of shoring up resources for higher value targets. The foot soldiers do not get a pass however, and just because members of al-Qa’ida do not meet the threshold for lethal targeting, other non-lethal counterterrorism options such as: arrest and imprisonment, asset seizure, and travel restriction remain on the table. As the National Strategy For Counterterrorism states, “certain tactical successes can have unintended consequences that sometimes contribute to costs at the strategic level.”¹¹² This fact can be mitigated through the inclusion of a deterrence strategy.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the new framework can continue giving the U.S. tactical successes while more closely aligning with U.S. strategic goals. Meanwhile, the framework will reduce controversy for the drone campaign which has been instrumental in our pursuit of al-Qa’ida to-date. The sustainable nature of the framework is also key. Being cost effective, efficient, and legally sound, it affords U.S. counterterrorism officials a long-term tool in what is promising to be a drawn out battle against al-Qa’ida.

That said, it is important to remember that deterrence is not perfect. The degree to which the prescribed framework will be effective may not be easily measured. Given that it is difficult to know how exactly threats are received by al-Qa’ida’s leadership, signaling may be an issue.¹¹³ It is also prudent to remember that there are no silver bullets for counterterrorism policy, and all policies are subject to failures and shortcomings. Consequently, though the framework will not be perfect, that does not mean that it is not the best way to pursue the drone campaign in the future. Indeed, the goal of the new framework is simply to create a sustainable path for the drone campaign while finding deterrent success at the margin. The new framework when coupled with deterrence by denial efforts creates a layered approach that, among other counterterrorism tools, becomes a new, more holistic approach to combating al-Qa’ida.

This paper does not cover the use of armed drones against U.S. citizens, use of drones inside the territorial confines of the U.S., or issues related to the morality of drone strikes. These issues are however important, and should be included in future discussion of drone policy.

NOTES