Fragmentation and Entrepreneurial Militancy: The Aftermath of the U.S. Drawdown in Afghanistan

20-Dec-2013 • Chris C.


INTRODUCTION

The September 11, 2001 attacks jolted the world and resulted in a multinational effort, led by the U.S., to eradicate al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. Beginning in October of 2001, the U.S. commenced its effort to unseat the Taliban government in Afghanistan which had close ties with al-Qa’ida and had given it a sanctuary where Usama bin Ladin and his followers were able to run terrorist training camps and plan terrorist attacks. Following the successful mission that led to the death of Usama bin Ladin in May 2011, U.S. attention shifted towards bringing the embattled troops, whom were still fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, home. Now in the twelfth year of conflict, the U.S. and its allies are gradually slowing operations. Down from the nearly 100,000 U.S. soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen that were deployed in Afghanistan at the war’s peak in 2011, there are roughly 47,000 troops in Afghanistan at-present.1 That number is anticipated to drop further to around 8,000 by year’s end if a deal can be struck with the Karzai government soon.2 If not, the number of U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan past 2014 could be substantially less.

While the majority of the U.S. public support an end to the war in Afghanistan, plans for a U.S. withdrawal have been met with a great deal of concern from some military commanders, and analysts alike. The fear is that the security situation in central and south Asia will deteriorate rapidly after the U.S. exit, and that terrorists will once again find sanctuary where the U.S. has spent hundreds of billions of dollars and given more than 2,200 American lives to combat the Taliban and al-Qa’ida.3 These worries are not unfounded given the current absence of a peace agreement with the Taliban and the fledgling state of the Afghan government and its security forces. In that token, this paper assesses how the U.S. and coalition force drawdown in, or withdraw from, Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will effect the greater Taliban movement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This paper finds that the militant landscape across central and south Asia is complex, and will only become more so as the contingent of U.S. and coalition forces draw down and ultimately leave Afghanistan. In the wake of the drawdown, with many competing interests amongst militants and high stakes on-the-line, the Taliban movement at large, will further fragment and spin off new groups. “Entrepreneurial militancy,” that is, the inter-group fighting that will take place with the intent of upsetting the status quo, will take hold in the near term. Once things sort out, it can be expected that there will be a rise in attacks against both the Afghan and Pakistani governments as militants seek to further consolidate power under the new order. In sum, while the key actors are unlikely to change much, motivations and the banners they seek power under, very well may.

Despite the likely increase in violence in the region, there will be opportunities for the U.S., Pakistan, and Afghanistan to make lasting changes and reduce the reach of the Taliban movement. Addressing Pashtun concerns, reducing corruption, engaging in counternarratives and bolstering strategic communication with target audiences, and lowering the dependency on drones, will go a long way towards undermining the Taliban’s foothold. This paper will first discuss the history of the Taliban movement and highlight the differences between the two umbrella organizations, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. It will then discuss the differences, similarities, and overlap between the groups which make up their respective parent organizations. Next the paper will make a modest attempt at predicting the most likely outcome following the U.S. drawdown. Lastly, the paper will put forth several opportunities that the U.S., Pakistan, and Afghanistan can pursue to lessen the impact of the drawdown.

BACKGROUND

An ancient warrior culture has evolved for over two millennia in what could be considered Pashtunistan, an expansive area straddling over a thousand miles of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.4 Since the 4th century B.C. when Alexander the Great struggled to conquer Pashtun tribesmen in today’s Malakand Agency, Pashtun tribes have fought the Mogul and British empires, Afghan rulers, the Soviet Union, and now the International Security Assistance Force and Afghan security forces, as well as the Pakistani military.5 Today there are twelve million ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan and twenty-seven million in Pakistan speaking Pashto and adhering to Pashtunwali (a traditional code of moral and legal conduct).6 Adding to the cultural and ethno-linguistic challenges of would-be governors, Pashtun tribes by-and-large do not recognize outside governance or borders. As a result, the friction between tribesmen and the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, respectively, has led to militancy.

AFGHAN TALIBAN

In recent history, the militant movements in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan largely trace their lineage to the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989). Seeking to counter rebellions and prop-up the weak pro-Soviet government in Kabul, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. This led to a protracted multinational insurgency that had thousands of foreign fighters from around the world joining the conflict in order to wage jihad (struggle) against the Soviets. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) began clandestinely training and equipping the mujahideen (strugglers) led insurgency at the onset of the war. Seeing an opportunity to fight the Soviet Union and the Communist Afghan government by proxy, the U.S. along with Britain and Saudi Arabia aided Pakistan in its effort to arm and train the mujahideen. As the International Crisis Group points out, “Pakistani support was based on fears of irredentist claims by Pashtun nationalists on its Pashtun borderlands; Saudi Arabia was guided by its Sunni Wahhabi/Salafi ideological preferences; the U.S. saw the Islamists as the most desirable ally against the Soviets and the Soviet-back Kabul communist regime.”7 Iran and China also provided arms and training to the mujahideen throughout the war, and continued their support for various groups thereafter. By 1989, the insurgency had exacted a toll great enough to force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.

In the wake of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Communist Afghan government was left to fend for itself with only Soviet economic and military aid. Warlords and mujahideen commanders fought for control of Afghanistan. The ensuing violence marked the beginning of the Afghan civil war. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his organization, Hizb-e-Islami, were initially the main beneficiary of support from Pakistan in the fight for Kabul.8 Fair points out that “Pakistan hoped that Hekmatyar would secure a corridor to Central Asia, beginning in Peshawar, continuing through Jalalabad and Kabul, stretching onward to Mazar-i-Sharif, and finally reaching Tashkent.”9 This lofty plan, however, would never come to fruition, and Pakistan slowly lessened its support as Hekmatyar routinely failed to meet the objectives of Pakistan. Mainly, he could not take Kabul. That said, Pakistan hedged its bets and continued to support Hekmatyar, if only in part, even after he later failed to reach an accord with the Taliban in 1994.10 Pakistan also supported the likes Jalaluddin Haqqani and his Haqqani Network (HQN), who like Hekmatyar, to this day is still fighting security forces in Afghanistan.

After three years of bloodshed, Najibullah resigned and his regime collapsed following the withdrawal of Soviet aid. Consequently, the mujahideen had control of Kabul by 1992. The Peshawar Accords, a peace and power sharing agreement, paved the way for the formation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Infighting continued amongst the mujahideen commanders as the Taliban (students), consisting of some elements of the mujahideen and Pashtun tribesmen educated in Pakistani madrassas (religious schools), was in its infancy in 1994.11 By September 1996, the Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar (whom is the leader of the Afghan Taliban to-this-day), and numbering between 80,000 and 100,000, had taken control of Kabul and ousted the Rabbani regime.12 The Taliban had overrun the last major city, Mazar-e Sharif, by 1998 and controlled the vast majority of the country by 2001.13 Pakistan’s support of the Taliban after it took positive control of Afghanistan continued openly until 2001, but became a quiet affair after the U.S. was attacked on 9/11. This of course, as Schofield points out, remains a continuation of Pakistan’s “1973 policy of counter-balancing secessionist Pashtun with Islamists.”14

PAKISTANI TALIBAN

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), commonly referred to as the Pakistani Taliban, was officially founded on December 14, 2007 in an announcement made by a shura (consultative committee) consisting of forty senior Taliban leaders.15 The shura of Taliban leaders from the tribal agencies of “North and South Waziristan, Khyber, Orakazi, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurram, as well as the settled districts of Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and the Malakand division,” named Baitullah Mehsud, a prominent Taliban commander from South Waziristan, as the emir (leader or commander) of the newly formed TTP.16 This was significant because it was the first time a shura with Taliban representatives from all seven of the tribal agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in addition to the settled North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (now the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province) districts convened and resulted in the aligning of interests.17

The groups which ultimately came together to form the TTP under Baitullah Mehsud, began operating much earlier. Abbas highlights that the metamorphosis of Taliban “supporters and sympathizers” to a formidable “Taliban force in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)” came about when disenfranchised tribal members began organizing and networking beginning in late 2002.18 Under pressure from the U.S. after 9/11, the Pakistani army made its way into the tribal region of Pakistan in an effort to root out members of al-Qa’ida. This infuriated many Pashtuns, and led to a widespread belief that Islamabad was under the thumb of the U.S., which in-turn placed the Pakistani government in the crosshairs of militants.

Taking things into their own hands, the militants began supplanting the governing structures, overseen by the Pakistani government, within the FATA and the then NWFP. Fair states that the “Talibnization of the tribal areas was initially limited to North and South Waziristan” before eventually spreading to Bajaur and “areas that had previously been free of such activity, including Mohmand, Orakzai, and Kurram agencies,” as well as the “frontier areas of Bannu, Tank Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, and Swat.”19 The campaign kicked off with the killing off of over 600 tribal elders, and “by the time the Pakistani government realized the changing dynamics and tried to resurrect the tribal jirga institution,” very little could be done.20

Nek Mohammad Wazir of South Waziristan was the first militant leader in Pakistan to gain notoriety. After the Pakistani army was shut down by Nek Mohammad’s forces in the spring of 2004, the Pakistani military was left in shame after it was forced to sign a “peace deal known as the Shakai Accord” completely on Nek Mohammad’s terms, and retreat.21 Shortly thereafter, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a commander from North Waziristan, gained attention as he assumed the status of emir (commander or leader) of the militancy in Pakistan.22 This was, however, short-lived as he was killed by a U.S. drone strike very soon after.

Prior to being named emir of the TTP in late 2007, Baitullah Mehsud had also been a commander in South Waziristan. Enraged with the Pakistani state which had begun military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan under increasing pressure from the West to root-out militants, Mehsud stated that the “government of Pakistan would be paid in the same coin now.”23 Thus indicating a shift in targeting from what had been a collective effort against coalition forces in Afghanistan within the “Taliban movement,” to a new focus on the Pakistani state. A spokesman for the TTP at the time emphasized that the objective of the newly formed organization was to attack the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan, and reiterated the organization’s stance against Pakistan, specifically the Pakistani military.24 Prior to being killed in a drone strike, Mehsud commanded upwards of thirty-thousand men against the Pakistani state.25 Conducting a nationwide suicide bombing campaign and forcing the Pakistani government to negotiate a peace agreement with him in 2006, he was widely seen as a successful and competent commander with the ability to inflict pain on the Pakistani government.26

Following Mehsud’s death in August 2009, his cousin, Hakimullah Mehsud, assumed control of the TTP. According to Pakistani news sources, Hakimullah was in the process of beginning negotiations with Islamabad when he was killed by a drone strike in November of 2013.27 Mullah Fazlullah, also known as Mullah Radio, is now the emir of the TTP.28

THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT

The “Taliban movement” is not monolithic. Rather, it is a complex system that contains two umbrella organizations, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, and their respective loose networks of militant groups fighting in their name. The casual usage of the the term “Taliban” (literally: religious students), even if appropriately subcategorized by one of the two umbrella organizations, when describing militants in the region, does not adequately capture the sheer complexity of the militant landscape in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have numerous features which renders them unique from their counterparts, but importantly, there are also similarities and overlaps between the groups. With regards to differences, origin, motivation(s), and sponsorship, usually in part, are defining characteristics. While similarities often include: ideology, composition (i.e., primary recruiting pools), means of financing, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Overlaps in membership, structure, area of operation, and targeting are also quite common.

ORIGINS

As was highlighted within the background portion of this paper, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban had unique beginnings, generally speaking. The Afghan Taliban, led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, came to power in in 1996 after a bloody civil war. The Afghan Taliban consisted largely of Pashtun mujahideen that had fought in the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-1989). It quickly became an international pariah as news of its gross human rights abuses, mistreatment of women, and its destruction of ancient Buddha statues at Bamiyan came to light.

Conversely, the Pakistani Taliban rose from various militant groups that had increasingly become upset with Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S. in its counterterrorism mission. When the Pakistani military invaded the FATA in early 2002, that was the final straw for many militants. The continued incursions by the Pakistani army and the progression of the war in Afghanistan, led a shura of Taliban representatives from all seven of Pakistan’s tribal agencies and in the, then settled North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), to form the TTP. The shura named Baitullah Mehsud the emir of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.

The one similarity between the two organizations is that both drew upon leaders and members that had once fought in the Soviet War in Afghanistan.

MOTIVATIONS

The motivational drivers of both the Afghan Taliban, and in particular Pakistani Taliban, are diverse. Some groups have differing goals along sectarian, ethnic, political, and criminal lines. Despite this fact, there are general motivations for both the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban which bring the groups together under their respective umbrella organization.

Broadly, the Afghan Taliban is mainly concerned with combating the U.S., coalition, and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan with the ultimate objective of retaking Kabul. In this effort, the Afghan Taliban has setup “shadow governments” that replace judicial, provincial, and district officials with its own police, administrators, and judges.29 Given the Afghan Taliban’s focus, “Taliban commanders and groups on the ground in Afghanistan couldn’t care less what’s happening to their Pakistani brothers across the border.”30 Moreover, as Fair states, “the Afghan Taliban does not pose a direct threat to Pakistan at this point, even though elements of the Afghan Taliban have grown somewhat independent of Islamabad.”31

On the other hand, the Pakistani Taliban does pose a threat to the Pakistani government. The stated goals and objectives of the TTP are several fold. First, it seeks to install and enforce Shari’a in Pakistan’s tribal region.32 Secondly, it seeks to wage jihad against the U.S. and coalition forces, as well as the Afghan security forces, in Afghanistan and against the Pakistani security forces in Pakistan.33 Lastly, the TTP wants Islamabad to cease all military incursions into the Tribal areas of Pakistan, remove all military checkpoints, and release prisoners associated with the Red Mosque incident.34

SPONSORSHIP

The Pakistani government has had a policy of sponsoring non-state actors nearly since its inception. It has, as was mentioned earlier in this paper, had a more or less formal policy of counter-balancing what it sees as the threat of secessionist Pashtuns with Islamists.35 This has led Islamabad to sponsor the Afghan Taliban, and before it, the mujahideen in Afghanistan.

Pakistan also has close ties with the HQN, subordinate actors to the Afghan Taliban. That said, Fair believes that since 2001, the ability of the Pakistani army and elements of the ISI to control the Afghan Taliban are waning. “Pakistan is widely assumed to wield significant influence over the Afghan Taliban, including the network of Jalaludin Haqqani [sic]…Since 2001, however, the Afghan Taliban have changed with the consistent turnover of mid-level commanders. New commanders are less beholden to Pakistan in part because of their age” and “the tribal base and moorings of the Afghan Taliban are also changing. Thus, Pakistan is struggling to cultivate influence among the evolving Afghan Taliban elements.”36

The Pakistani Taliban is not sponsored by Pakistan given that it targets the state. This fact has even resulted in friction between the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban. “They don’t like the way that the Pakistan Taliban has been fighting the Pakistan government and causing a whole load of problems there.”37

IDEOLOGY

In general, both the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban share a common Deobandi ideology. On a micro level, however, the groups that make up the Afghan Taliban, and especially the Pakistani Taliban, have more diverse ideologies, but are brought back together by common goals. That stated, on a macro level, there is a bifurcation of views within each camp. Some within the Afghan Taliban align with al-Qa’ida and support the views of “Mullah Omar and the hard-line Taliban.”38 Others within the Afghan Taliban focus on their Pashtun roots and concern themselves primarily with Pashtun affairs (e.g., irredentism).39 Similarly, one group within the Pakistani Taliban has aligned with “al-Qaeda and has primarily focused its activities against the Pakistani state and the Pakistani Army, making participation in the war in Afghanistan a secondary pursuit.”40 The other half of the Pakistani Taliban “closely follow the Afghan Taliban’s advice and focus on fighting against US and NATO forces inside Afghanistan.”41

COMPOSITION

The Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban have very similar demographics. Both are majority Pashtun organizations and recruit boys and young men. Often times these recruits are either desperately poor, have been trained in a Taliban or Taliban-oriented madrasa (school), have been internally displaced by counterinsurgency/counterrorism related violence, have lost friends and/or family in the ongoing regional conflict, or some combination of the above. Both Talibans also host foreign fighters.

FINANCING

The means of financing for both the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban have been largely the same. Each organization has resorted to multiple forms of criminality to fund their campaigns. Drug production and sale, arms smuggling and sales, various forms of taxation, kidnappings for ransom, bank robbery, smuggling, bootlegging, and extortion top the list of their money making schemes. To justify the nefarious means they use to finance their operations, militants have hand-picked “religious decree.”42 Moreover, both have also turned to legal means of earning money. Licit businesses have been opened by both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. Of high relevance, the HQN is involved in sophisticated money laundering operations. Gretchen Peters has offered seminal work on the subject.43

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

The fluid nature of membership in militant organizations in south/central Asia has resulted in high levels of institutional knowledge and common tactics, techniques, and procedures. The presence of al-Qa’ida in the region is widely believed to have influenced the tactics, techniques, and procedures of both the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban. Suicide bombings, as well as beheadings and the mutilation of enemy are highly suggestive of this thesis. Also, bomb making techniques have been shared. As employment tactics evolve on the battlefield, they have been passed along as well.

MEMBERSHIP

As was mentioned in the previous subsection, membership is fluid between the militant organizations in the region. On the issue, former commander of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, General (Ret.) David Petraeus stated that “There is clearly a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations: al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, TNSM [Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi]. And it’s very difficult to parse and to try to distinguish between them. They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other. But at the end of the day, there is quite a relationship between them.”44

Fair has also found a connection between Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), their parent Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami (JUI), and both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. “Notably, these sectarian tanzeems [LeJ and SSP] have overlapping membership with other Deobandi militant groups, including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, all of which have strong connections to JUI.”45 Furthermore she asserts that, “Punjab-based groups such as the Deobandi LeJ and JM are components of the TTP and conduct attacks on behalf of it. In fact, the so-called Punjabi Taliban groups form the backbone of the TTP and have played an important role in attacking Sufi, Shia, Ahmedi, and other civilian targets in the Punjab.”46 She also points out that the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and other Deobandi militant groups have “also been operating in Afghanistan against U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces.”47

In terms of numbers, between 20,000 and 25,000 Pakistani Taliban militants currently reside in the FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.48 This is down from the nearly 40,000 militants that lived in the tribal region during 2005 and 2006.49 In contrast, the Afghan Taliban only fields 14,000 to 20,000 fighters.50 Qazi’s total puts the total strength of the Taliban movement between 34,000 and 45,000 fighters.51 Within the predominantly Pashtun cadres, Punjabis in addition to Arab, Chechen, and Uzbek foreign fighters, as well as others, also account.52

STRUCTURE

The Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban are both umbrella organizations for disparate groups that form, more or less, a network based on a reltionship of convenience. In Afghanistan, “…the Taliban movement, which was never a tight and cohesive political entity in any case, has become an even looser network of affiliated individuals and groups since it was forced from power in Kabul. Today, the Taliban “alliance” can be characterized as a disparate congeries of several elements united only by a common religious ideology, a desire to regain power in Afghanistan or in their local areas of operation, and a deep antagonism toward the United States and its regional allies.”53

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt describe the TTP as “a system of loose networks. These networks tend to be dispersed and varying in size; however, the various nodes can communicate with each other and, to some degree, coordinate campaigns.”54

AREA OF OPERATION

There is a great deal of overlap with regards to area of operation between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. Both operate in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, albeit primarily in the tribal regions. That said, Pakistani Taliban has been far more expeditionary. Not only has it moved into Pashtun communities within Pakistan, it has also attempted intercontinental terrorism (e.g., the failed Times Square bombing), and sent skilled bomb making militants to join fellow Islamists in the Syrian civil war.

TARGETING

Within the Afghan Taliban, those that align with al-Qa’ida and support the views of “Mullah Omar and the hard-line Taliban” focus on attacking the U.S. and coalition forces as well as the Afghan govenment.55 Those within the Afghan Taliban whom focus on their Pashtun roots and concern themselves primarily with Pashtun affairs (e.g., irredentism), also fight the U.S., coalition forces, and the Afghan government.56 Similarly, one element of the Pakistani Taliban, also aligned with al-Qa’ida, “has primarily focused its activities against the Pakistani state and the Pakistani Army, making participation in the war in Afghanistan a secondary pursuit.”57 The other half of the Pakistani Taliban “closely follow the Afghan Taliban’s advice and focus on fighting against US and NATO forces inside Afghanistan.”58 As mentioned above, the Pakistani Taliban is more expeditionary in nature and even targeted the U.S. when it sponsored an attempted bombing in Times Square in 2010.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE U.S. DRAWDOWN

While predicting what will happen after the U.S. drawdown is not easy, there are indicators which aid in assessing what is likely to happen with regards to the Taliban movement. These indicators include historical indicators (i.e., what happened after the Soviets left in 1989) and indicators based on what is going on right now in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These indicators result in two main themes.

First, there will be fragmentation within both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. As with the Soviet war in Afghanistan, it can be reasonably expected that a number of militants will lay down arms and return home. This will reduce cadres where individual militants felt like their contributions were defensive in nature (i.e., they felt that they were waging defensive jihad against the U.S. and coalition forces). Another factor that causes fragmentation is the pursuit of new opportunities. For militant leaders and soldiers alike, there will be numerous opportunities militarily, politically, economically, and even criminally after the U.S. has lessened its presence. With opportunity seeking and the shift in militant forces, the various groups which make up the respective Talibans will have to re-balance. Some groups will gain members while other groups may outright dissolve. Also, consistent with opportunity seeking, we are likely to see new offshoots which will challenge long-standing groups for power and control.

In that vein, the second theme is “entrepreneurial militancy.” Entrepreneurial militancy, as the name suggests, occurs when groups or organizations seek to take advantage of actual or perceived opportunities in a militant manner. This will result in a great deal of infighting as was witnessed with the mujahideen after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan in 1989. Furthermore, there is a high expectation that violence will surge in the wake of the U.S. drawdown. Many Afghan civilians are already preparing for the worst, suspecting that they may have another civil war to contend with in the near future. While the concern is perhaps a natural response for those that experienced the turmoil that ensued throughout the early and mid-1990s, a drawn out civil war is a low probability.

After the shakeup of groups that makeup the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban ends and there is a degree of equilibrium, there will be an intensification of the campaign against both the Afghan government and Pakistani government. This can be expected for several reasons. First, groups will be jockeying for power and control vis-a-vis the governments. Secondly, there will be the desire to demonstrate operational capacity. And lastly, the groups will want prestige within the Islamist community.

FRAGMENTATION

Intergroup conflict is not a new phenomenon for the Taliban movement. Much of the fighting is due to the loose nature of intergroup affiliation within the Taliban movement. This may be advantageous in terms of each group having a high level of autonomy, but where you have autonomy, little central authority, and a lack of discipline, conflict can result. Qazi emphasizes, “It is most essential to recognize, however, that these militants do not form a united front and that the current insurgent movement is actually decentralized and often fractured, suffering from indiscipline, disagreement, and rebel infighting.”59 A prime example of this was Baitullah Mehsud’s conflict with Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur. It stemmed in part due to a traditional intertribal rivalry, but mostly was the result of intergroup competition.60 It became so heated that in 2008, “Baitullah Mehsud had Haji Namdar Khan (Khyber Agency) assassinated after he joined a rival group along with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir.”61 An example of traditional intertribal rivalry is that between the Wazirs and the Mehsuds. This type of “feuding is representative of agnatic (cousin) rivalry, also called tarboorwali.”62

Splintering is also going on within the Taliban movement. As the opportunities have changed, so have many of Pakistan’s militant groups. Fair states that since “late 2001 and 2002, many of Pakistan’s militant groups–particularly those of Deobandi background–have either splintered or changed their targets and tactics. Many Deobandi groups are tightly allied to the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans and are increasingly aiming their resources at the Pakistani state, even though some elements within these groups continue to enjoy various levels of formal and informal state support.”63 Moreover, the Pakistani Taliban itself has given way to a number of offshoot groups.64

It is also expected that the current type of violence, particularly that which is being seen in Pakistan, will lead to more splintering of the Taliban movement. Gruesome beheadings, the mutilation of foes, and the indiscriminate violence, to include suicide bombings, increasingly against civilian targets is taking a toll. Widely believed to be the influence of al-Qa’ida in the region, these tactics do not resonate well with the public. In demonstrating the desire to expand the fight beyond the tribal regions, and pursue new tactics, the group has inevitably run up against dissention from within its ranks.65

Additionally, it is worthwhile to point out that some militants will stop fighting after the U.S. leaves. It is difficult to project just how many will do this, but if history serves as an example, there should be a fair amount. Tangentially, another thing that needs to be considered is the security threat that awaits in countries that will be receiving returning foreign fighters. Some central Asian countries are already preparing for the possibility of hardened terrorists returning and taking up their cause at home.66

ENTREPRENEURIAL MILITANCY

As put forth above, entrepreneurial militancy, occurs when groups or organizations seek to take advantage of actual or perceived opportunities in a militant manner. One clear example of militants seeking new opportunities is the substantial rank-letting that occurred within Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen upon the initial notoriety gained by the Pakistani Taliban in its fight against the Pakistani army. Iqbal and De Silva highlight that Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, “suffered substantial fractionalisation as a number of foot soldiers deserted and joined the TTP in FATA.”67

In terms of the U.S. drawdown, Abbas believes that the Pakistani Taliban will shift its attention to Afghanistan, for the most part, once it has secured its presence in the FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.68 He is not alone in this believe either, according to an interview Christine Fair conducted with Pakistani army officers, there is close to a “unanimous” belief that once the U.S. leaves Afghanistan that Pakistani militants will stop targeting Pakistan.69 Underscoring these beliefs is the perception that the Pakistani Taliban will ultimately find more opportunities in Afghanistan. Though that is likely to occur to some degree, it is unlikely that the entire Taliban movement will shift its focus to Afghanistan. Assuming that insecurity is enough to pull most Pakistan focussed militants to Afghanistan, there is not going to be a security vacuum in Afghanistan. It is anticipated that the U.S. will retain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, as well as special operations forces and drone assets in the region for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Afghan security forces will continue to combat insurgents to their fullest capacity.

OPPORTUNITIES TO LESSEN THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. DRAWDOWN

There are several opportunities for the U.S. and its regional partners to lessen the potential fallout after the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan. First, it will be important to address the factors that have and will continue to impede progress in the region. The “short-sighted military polices and a colonial-era body of law” that has handicapped the tribal areas of Pakistan by placing tribal residents in “an ambiguous constitutional status and denying political freedom and economic opportunity,” and led to Pashtun disenfranchisement, will become a policy imperitive.70

Heavy-handed tactics, the over-use of force, and inconsistent military policy will have to give way to smarter policies that address grievances and eliminate “impediments to economic development,…trade, business opportunities, and transportation and shipment of goods.”71 Put differently, “The underlying goal in defeating militancy should not be to restore the old order, but to mainstream the tribal areas with the rest of Pakistan” while “creating opportunities for a representative political leadership and stimulating economic development.”72 Islamabad should also take a hard look at its sponsorship strategies. Are the costs of empowering militants really worth it?

Afghanistan also has plenty of work to do. If the Afghan government cannot rid itself of its current level of corruption, it is unlikely that it will become popular with the Afghan populous anytime soon. Relatedly, Afghanistan needs to take a serious look at its drug enforcement problem. Obviously, Afghanistan is heavily dependent upon its allies for financial, technological, and logistical aid at this point in time, but it has the power to make it a priority. Until poppy production is reduced, and consequently, the largest source of Taliban income is curbed, Afghanistan’s internal security will continue to be threatened. Finally, Afghanistan needs to work on its diplomatic relations with Pakistan. The threat posed by the Taliban movement cannot be solved unless both Afghanistan and Pakistan are in league together in the fight. As long as there are subversionary policies in place, there will be no progress at either end.

For the U.S., it will be important to revise counterterrorism policy in a manner that will be sustainable in terms of the political realities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In other words, the U.S. will need to revisit its drone policy and make sure that its use of airstrikes is not causing unnecessary barriers to progress. As a part of this reassessment, non-kinetic opportunities need to be looked at as well. Not only are they less costly in terms of money and life, but arguably they have unrealized potential.

CONCLUSION

The militant landscape across central and south Asia has always been complex, but will only become more so as the large contingent of U.S. and coalition counterinsurgent and counterterrorist forces leave Afghanistan. New opportunities will be abundant and result in “entrepreneurial militancy” in the near term. Thus, with many competing interests and high stakes, the Taliban movement, at large, will further fragment and spin off new groups. While the key actors are unlikely to change, motivations and the banners they seek power under, very well may.

That being said, opportunity will not simply be limited to the Taliban and associated militant groups. The U.S. as well as regional powers like Pakistan, India, Iran, China, and indeed the Afghan government itself, will also have opportunities. It can be predicted that these opportunities will be viewed differently state-by-state, and the respective policies put forth will in many cases be in direct competition with other states. Nevertheless, regional security and countering the threat posed by militants is in everyone’s best interest.

It is important to emphasize that religious underpinned militancy is not created in a vacuum. Much of the violence attributable to militants in the region could have been reduced absent aggressive policy by Islamabad over the last quarter century. Whether in terms of Islamizing Pakistan or sponsoring militant organizations like the Afghan Taliban.73 There are, however, opportunities to reduce terrorism in the coming years.

While the U.S. will continue to see out its commitment to Afghanistan’s security, in whatever shape that ultimately takes, there is a great deal of room for improving our counterterrorism approach to the Taliban movement. First, drones will not win the hearts and minds of the constituents most recruited by the movement, nor will it be decisive. That is not to say that drones cannot be used or that they do not have their place. Rather, it is to say that a great deal of caution should be used when considering strikes. Non-kinetic options that are at-present underutilized are counternarratives, as a part of U.S. strategic communication, and progressive approaches to dealing with religion (e.g., Johnston’s “faith-based diplomacy”).

Pakistan should pay attention to addressing the root causes of Pashtun militancy in its Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Simply put, Pakistan’s internal security is largely dependent upon it putting aside its anxieties over Pashtun nationalism, dispensing of colonial era laws and provisions, building infrastructure and capacity in the tribal regions (with the help of the international community), and affording the millions of Pashtuns residing in the tribal areas of Pakistan with the same rights as other Pakistani citizens. This will not eliminate conflict or end terrorism within Pakistan or Afghanistan. It will, however, go a long way towards building relations with the largest recruitment pool militant organizations have in the region.

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NOTES

  1. “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures,” NATO, June 6, 2011, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/110606-isaf-placemat.pdf; and Jessica Donati and Mark Felsenthal, “U.S. says may pull out all troops as Afghan leader holds up deal,” Reuters, November 26, 2013, accessed December 12, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/26/us-afghanistan-usa-idUSBRE9AP03J20131126.

  2. Jessica Donati and Mark Felsenthal, “U.S. says may pull out all troops as Afghan leader holds up deal.”

  3. “Operation Enduring Freedom,” Department of Defense, accessed December 19, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf.

  4. Scott Shane, “The War in Pashtunistan,” New York Times, December 5, 2009, December 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/weekinreview/06shane.html; and Milt Bearden, “The Pashtuns of Afghanistan: Alexander the Great also got in trouble here,” New York Times, March 31, 2004, December 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/31/opinion/31iht-edbearden_ed3__3.html.

  5. “The Pashtuns of Afghanistan: Alexander the Great also got in trouble here.”

  6. Scott Shane, “The War in Pashtunistan.”

  7. “Taliban Propaganda: Winning The War Of Words?,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report Number 158, July 24, 2008, accessed December 12, 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/158_taliban_propaganda___winning_the_war_of_words.pdf.

  8. “Taliban Propaganda: Winning The War Of Words?,” 3.

  9. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” Asia Policy, Number 11 (2011): 115.

  10. Julian Schofield, “Diversionary wars: Pashtun unrest and the sources of Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Volume 17, Number 1 (2011): 46.

  11. Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified August 6, 2013, December 1, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

  12. Ibid; and Julian Schofield, “Diversionary wars: Pashtun unrest and the sources of Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation,” 45.

  13. “Taliban Propaganda: Winning The War Of Words?,” 3.

  14. Julian Schofield, “Diversionary wars: Pashtun unrest and the sources of Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation,” 46.

  15. Zachary Laub, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified November 18, 2013, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422; and Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” Combating Terrorism Center, January 15, 2008, 1, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

  16. Bill Roggio, “Pakistani Taliban unites under Baitullah Mehsud,” Long War Journal, December 15, 2007, December 1, 2013, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/pakistani_taliban_un.php.

  17. Zachary Laub, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists.”

  18. Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” 1.

  19. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 125.

  20. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 22, Number 4 (2011): 578; and Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” 1.

  21. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 124.

  22. Ibid.

  23. Ibid.

  24. Ibid.

  25. Ibid.

  26. Ibid.

  27. Omer Farooq Khan, “Malala attacker to lead Taliban,” The Times of India, November 8, 2013, accessed November 29, 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Malala-attacker-to-lead-Taliban/articleshow/25400078.cms

  28. Ibid.

  29. Thomas H. Johnson, “Taliban adaptations and innovations,” 9.

  30. Scott Shane, “Insurgents Share a Name, but Pursue Different Goals,” New York Times, October 22, 2009, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/world/asia/23taliban.html.

  31. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 117.

  32. Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” Combating Terrorism Center, January 15, 2008, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

  33. Ibid.

  34. Ibid.

  35. Julian Schofield, “Diversionary wars: Pashtun unrest and the sources of Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation,” 46.

  36. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 129.

  37. Scott Shane, “Insurgents Share a Name, but Pursue Different Goals,” New York Times, October 22, 2009, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/world/asia/23taliban.html.

  38. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” 582.

  39. Ibid.

  40. Ibid.

  41. Ibid.

  42. Khuram Iqbal and Sara De Silva, “Terrorist lifecycles: a case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” 77-78.

  43. See Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 31, 2012, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf.

  44. David H. Petraeus, “Shared Goals for Pakistan’s Militants,” Council on Forieng Relations, May 6, 2010, December 1, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/shared-goals-pakistans-militants/p22064.

  45. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 121-122.

  46. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 127.

  47. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 121.

  48. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” 587.

  49. Ibid.

  50. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” 588.

  51. Ibid.

  52. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” 587.

  53. Tellis, “Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” 21.

  54. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 122-123.

  55. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” 582.

  56. Ibid.

  57. Ibid.

  58. Ibid.

  59. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” 581.

  60. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” 583.

  61. Ibid.

  62. Ibid.

  63. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 127-128.

  64. Khuram Iqbal and Sara De Silva, “Terrorist lifecycles: a case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” 85.

  65. Khuram Iqbal and Sara De Silva, “Terrorist lifecycles: a case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” 81.

  66. Vadim Kozyulin, “Afghanistan-2014 And The Taliban With Its Head Held Proud But Low,” 76.

  67. Khuram Iqbal and Sara De Silva, “Terrorist lifecycles: a case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” 78.

  68. Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” 3.

  69. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” 117.

  70. “Pakistan: Countering Militancy,” i.

  71. “Pakistan: Countering Militancy,” 8.

  72. “Pakistan: Countering Militancy,” 23.

  73. Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Pakistan - The Threat From Within,” 10.

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Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Publications
Tags
Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban, Tribal, Militant, Pashtun, TTP, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan